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**East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Sociologist on Quest for Czech Identity

91CH0109A Prague PRITOMNOST in Czech  
21 Sep 90 pp 18-19

[Article by Jaroslav Stritecky: "The Problem of Czech Identity"]

[Text] That we are Czechs and how this is recognized has not been, and is not, as obvious as it might at first seem. Right now many Czechs are claiming to be Moravians or Silesians, not only because of the territory from which they come or where they live, but also because of family, culture, history, and, heavens, even language. They assemble, sing anthems, play on feelings, collect signatures, and they are not alone in claiming to be a people. It would not surprise me if some Czechs began to say that they are more honorable than other Czechs, and that they will use their new found freedom to right the Premyslovite betrayal at Slavnikovce. To say nothing of whether other Czechs might be the most honorable of all by allying with the Germans or at least learning German. If one looks at the intelligentsia of the first generation of the awakening, this wouldn't be as absurd after all.

T.G. Masaryk once told Karel Capek about Moravian and Hungarian Slovaks. Today some are Czechs and some are Slovaks. If it had not been for the defiant Moravians, who knows but that the Slovak people might have spread to the West as far as the Drahanska highlands, or that the Czech eastern border might not be the river Vah. I wouldn't even attempt to think about potential Czecho-Polish intermingling, as indicated by certain linguistic phenomena, because nationalists on both sides of the abstract North Moravian border are known for their intolerance and willingness to move from words to actions.

Let's not think, though, that these inconsistencies are peculiar, or even a Czech character flaw. Germans have had, and continue to have, no fewer difficulties with national identification. Perhaps this is why the cry "Germany One Fatherland", or "One People, One Nation..." have such a deeply emotional attraction, although they are from the same roots as Goethe or Beethoven.

Joining North Germans, Bavarians, Prussians, Rhinelanders, Saxons, and Swabians into an abstract union of blood and land could be accomplished only by a truly unearthly act. How could the German-speaking Swiss or most Austrians escape?! And who were "our Germans", Germans living in Bohemia and Moravia?! How is it that sometimes they have been Austrians, sometimes Czech and Moravian patriots, and sometimes Germans?! And many of the most Germanized were originally Czechs, judging from their names.

The picture with which large groups of people identify as a people is composed of various parts, which can only be made whole by interpretation. The interpretation is most

often historical or historicizing, and selects only some of the possible identifiers, then fashions them into a myth. This in turn makes possible the collective suggestion that this picture is something natural, something that in a long historical process has found itself, something that can only be joined, or willfully betrayed.

Modern national myths have two roots. The first is the emotional energy of home experiences, or at least a longing for them, transformed to a fiction of a home for everyone together. The second is the idea of a civil society, descending from the human horizon to the apparently natural borders of individual ethnic groups. The first is the hypostatizing of community from experiences that are exclusively concrete and individual. The second looks like the concretization of the abstract, but in reality involves the heterogeneous crossing of ethnic with civil viewpoints. Both approaches clearly lead to the crowding out of a real structure of interests by the abstract fiction of a national collective.

Even the most peaceful national identification falls in the category of the undemocratic. The ideological battles over the differences between patriotism and nationalism and similar pseudoproblems show how painful this point is. Undemocratic identification unifies, and isolates the entire collective identified by these differences, from others. It forms a "WE" entity with a unified, positive value, and a "THEY" entity, the outsiders from whom we are so different.

Democratic identification is attained through communication. It does not unify, it mediates. It teaches us that we are all the same in that we are different, and have our own interests, instincts, values, goals. It fosters a fully acceptable diversity. Therefore, in conflict we not only can, but must communicate.

But let us return to the problem of the Czech identity. I will not concern myself here with what does and does not constitute this identity. If this were clear there would be no identity problem. Let's just sample part of the material that the national myth draws upon in arguments.

The state is undoubtedly a very strong national identifier, especially as an idea. The Czechs, it is well known, have had a historical state with a long and continuous past. It is therefore no surprise that the constitutional point of view was invoked strongly in the search for a modern identity. This has served as a kind of bridge from the medieval concept of statehood to the modern. The defense of the continuity of Czech statehood was an inseparable part of Czech policy in the 19th century. As we know, it was not without problems.

One of the problems was that these efforts conflicted with both greater Austrian conservative and modernizing trends. Things became even more complex, because the defense of Czech statehood utilized both components: the conservative, in the anticentralist defense of the rights of the Czech crown and its related land ownership advocated mainly by the traditional representative structures—mainly the aristocracy—and

the modernizing (advocated by nontraditional social representatives and initiatives which came to be more and more differentiated along national lines).

A second serious problem was that the true potential for a nation state was lacking to bridge the gap between the older and modern form of statehood. The idea of a nation state in the pre-March period was linked, all over Europe, with the concept of civil liberation, more overtly in some places than others. This is also why this idea was considered subversive within the Holy Alliance system. On the other hand it must be recognized that the civic idea and the national idea coincided rather by coincidence than in substance, as shown by the so-called German war of national liberation, among other things. These ideas were a mobilizing factor behind significant antifeudal reform in Prussia, struggled with applied forms of community enlightenment, and as such were an important source of the most aggressive strains of German nationalism.

It was not possible to build a nation state in our country. Neither in the context of a pre-Litovsk part of Austro-Hungary—if it was to be a historical Czech state, and not a division similar to the post-Munich “Czecho”, scraping along for not even six months—nor afterwards. As a sign of Czech national identity the Czech state can be considered only as the price of silent usurpation. This became evident in the argument over the first Czechoslovak constitution. To be sure, there was success in defending the civic base of the new republic against Czech nationalism, success in defending a constitution that did not put German, Polish, Ukrainian, and Hungarian fellow citizens in the position of second class citizens. This was *de jure* only, however. There was no time to develop reliable rules for fully satisfactory coexistence.

The year 1918 brought the end of the Czech state. This did not happen by gaining independence, which in fact never had adequate underpinnings. Nor did it happen with change in the form of the state. The historical Czech state expired with the expansion to the East, to Upper Hungary. I am not saying that this was an erroneous, unjustified step. But nevertheless it created a new pattern of a number of serious problems, a pattern that it would be desirable to analyze as soberly as possible, rather than covering over its weak points with emotions.

Historically and legally such a step cannot be justified. The justification by natural law, based on the Slovak right to self determination, gives rise to a number of unintended side effects that are difficult to control. First, self determination for the Slovaks was accepted in a Czechoslovak form. Practically speaking, at the time this happened it probably could not have happened any other way. A power vacuum had arisen here and it was only a question of who would fill it. I think that the Czech expansion was more acceptable to the Slovaks than a reimposition of Hungarian hegemony would have been. Still, it resulted in that strange national asymmetry, the consequences of which we are still dealing with, despite

all the changes that have occurred. When the establishment of the federation justifiably pushed Czech nationhood back to its historical boundaries, it by chance couldn't find itself in its own home.

In the “postrevolutionary” months this matter was again taken by its symbolic tail, with agitated crowds forming to do battle over national symbols. This is natural, or more precisely, naturally perverted. It is easier to resolve external symbols than to deal with the convoluted problems of nationhood and other important matters in the home, the streets, and in parliament. Deep dissatisfaction has floated to the surface. This dissatisfaction had been repressed for so long that it will still take some time for it to take a form that will allow us to understand it, analyze it, and find out where it comes from and what it actually is all about.

Do we need to involve ourselves in the paradox connected with the implementation of the idea of the nation state in Central European conditions? What if, on the threshold of the 21st century, we finally go beyond the 19th century world view, the propensity to make that which is different the same, the narrow minded insistence on viewing the world as ours and only ours?! A nation would be an excellent vehicle for this, but a civil nation, a practical institution that facilitates the communication of the most acceptable rules of coexistence and assures validity without exception for those agreed upon rules.

The concept of ethnicity has been used extensively and powerfully as an identifier. It would be worth counting how much our ancestors would have been willing to pay for archaeological proof of how long we have been here, how wonderful our personalities have always been, how advanced our standard of living, and how, therefore, our country belongs to us and no one else. Archaeology is a science based on infinitely patient curiosity, while its application to national questions short circuits this process. My ears still ring from the assertion in my student years that ceramic, bell-shaped chalices were not brought to us by nomads but were actually the fashion in the Czech lands at that time.

The concept that after hundreds, no, thousands of years, two antithetical ethnic principles, the Slavic and the Germanic, collided in Central Europe and that their struggle there has formed history and its purpose suits Czech and German nationalists. They did not derive this from actual historical facts. They accepted it as a given theorem from the French and English romantic historians and authors. The original version, which the reader knows from the novels of Walter Scott, and Thierry's historical work of the Norman conquest of England, explained the rise of feudalism as the conquest, the subjugation of one people by another. The program of the liberal democratic revolution was coded in the form of the suppressed ethnic who needed to be liberated. The population of this framework with “national characters” fluctuated with the circumstances, but the framework remained the same.

Where it was impossible to prove that one people had been subjugated by another, the act of conquest was stylized as a struggle of national characters. For instance, the liberal German historian, Georg Gottfried Gervinus, saw the purpose of German history in the struggle between imperiously universal romanticism and freedom loving Germanism. The key point of this interpretation was the concept of the reformation as an anti-Roman manifestation of the character of the German soul. Similarly, Palacky transferred this framework to Czech history, of course with the difference that the lust for freedom was a Czech characteristic, while the German element brought us feudal imperiousness. For Palacky, Husitism was the culmination of Czech history for the same reasons that the German reformation was the culmination of German history for Gervinus.

I, of course, am not planning to object that in addition to the Czech ethnic group and the German ethnic group the territory of the Czech nation was also populated by many Italians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Poles, Jews, and many other peoples. The Czechs and the Germans have been the most numerous, however, for some time. Differentiating between them is not as easy as it may appear, and one can maintain true ethnic continuity only to a limited extent. Trained ethnographers have learned, to be sure, that water goblins, water nymphs, and other aquatic monsters are of Slavic origin, while other creatures are of German ancestry. However, this is not valid for modern national identification purposes. No evident national differences in appearance, behavior, or culture have ever existed for inhabitants of these areas. Regional and social differences have been much more evident. Therefore an entire group of ideas connected with the life of a national soul could be transferred freely from one context to another. This allows German children far from the borders of the Czech kingdom to have their water nymphs and goblins, while their Czech peers consider it completely normal to encounter a gingerbread house on a vacation in Germany.

Language is the one sign that clearly distinguishes. But for some time not even identification by language was very reliable. Josef's reforms brought not only modernization impulses, but also a muddying of the language situation. All educated people, not only those with the highest education, but anyone who had more than a rudimentary schooling, was taught in German. In this regard one must not overlook differences in the mother tongue, just as this cannot be overlooked in the Latin universalism of the middle ages. Josef's Germanism never achieved this degree of integrity.

It is frequently believed that this Germanization put Czechs at a disadvantage and gave an advantage to the Germans. From Jungmann to Masaryk, Czech intellectuals recall how they felt slighted at the gymnasiums because at first they were not good at German. Wasn't in this case nationality only one name for the social frustration experienced by both poor and rural students of German? Czechs of that time, by the way, learned German exceptionally well. They experienced greater difficulties perhaps when using Czech to

express complex cultural concepts, describe natural phenomena, technology, etc. This was not the first time, and has nothing at all to do with the advantages of one or the disadvantages of another language. What was happening was the de-Latinization of education, not its nationalization. A dead language was being replaced by a living one, but the function of a universal cultural language was to remain untouched, as was the case with Latin. From Halic we know how difficult it was to Germanize the Jews, even though they spoke Yiddish at home, a language that is based on German. The same was true of educated Germans who came from the lower classes. They also had to learn German as a cultural language, just as the German educated Czechs had to learn cultural Czech.

For these reasons the question of Czechness or Germanness was more or less a matter of choice, as Emanuel Radl has already noted. One cannot derive this choice from historical factors. History only established a framework within which that which occurred was possible.

While the educated interest of the enlightenment in slavistics can be easily imagined outside of the German context, Jungmann's choice of a language based rationalism is unthinkable without this context. This is related to the asynchronous course of German and Czech modernization: the foundations of a civic culture were fully built before the other components of social life were modernized. Czechs educated in German had here before their eyes a unique example of how to actually create the culture of a new age, rather than deriving it from an old continuum.

Language here is not merely a system of expression, a medium that we might use to find out certain things. Language here directly forms and constitutes reality, before it is poured over economics, politics, and into nature. A world of Germanness. A world of Czechness.

Jungmann's arguments of 1806 appear quite democratic. He demanded that the intelligentsia not become strangers to the Czech countryside, that the elite be able to communicate with the people. It sounds great, but makes sense only within Herder's vision of a national spirit that lives fully only in language, and the language in the people, i.e. among nonurban inhabitants. This vision saved for us many beautiful songs, folktales, and clothing. Adherents of this view have tried with tears in their eyes to catch sight, over the current decadence, of the form of a happy future in the evidence of the distant past, both actual and imagined. The ideal of a civil society is far away. Therefore Jungmann argues most strongly based on the situation of the Czech countryside, not based on definitions of human and civil rights.

Jan Patocka, 21 years ago, tried to revive the Bolzano pole of our national revival. But his work presented a dilemma in our national program. Jungmann and Bolzano (1969) has a good reputation today. Patocka has

not made out much better in this regard, I think than Emanuel Radl before him. Those who are rational are not national.

Can you imagine a situation where Czech and German-speaking citizens form a single community of people? Of course assuming that the practical difficulties of dual languages were resolved by programmatic agreements, not nationalism? Those who find this absurd from the start should be aware that the concept of Czechoslovakism was no different in character, and that it did not founder on the language issue after its 20-year existence. It was not like Bolzano in that it contained an anti-German and anti-Hungarian thorn. But then, German and Hungarian national counterarguments were also not like Bolzano. The civic alternative, after all, does not depend on national tolerance, but on absolute tolerance. In a nation founded and functioning on firmly civic principles, language issues have the same insignificant weight as medieval heraldry, striptease, or any other ceremony.

Jaroslav Stritecky (1941) has been teaching since 1966 at the Brno Philosophical Faculty, first philosophy, then the history of sociology and the sociology of culture. He has studied liberal conceptions of peoples and nations, Dilthey's works (a book, *History and Historicity. Studies on the problem of the Individual and Unity in Dilthey and Kant*), aesthetic formalism, as well as the works of W. Benjamin and German literature.

#### Federal Deputy Premier Reviews Current Political Problems

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pp 6-7

[Interview with the deputy premier of the federal government, Pavel Rychetsky, Dr. of Law, by Ivan Lamper; place and date not given: "The Morally Binding Battle of Slavkov"]

[Text] Pavel Rychetsky, born 17 August 1943 in Prague. After graduating from high school in 1960 he worked for a year as an excavator and concrete mixer. From 1961 to 1966 he studied at the Law Faculty of Charles University in Prague. In 1966 he was put on the waiting list to work for the municipal court in Prague.

From 1 September 1967 he worked as an expert assistant at the Civil Law Department of the Law Faculty at Charles University in Prague. From 1967 to 1970 he was a member of the KSC [Czechoslovak Communist Party—CPCZ]. In Spring 1970 he was forced to leave and up to the end of 1989 he first worked as a lawyer in an advertising agency, and later as a lawyer in an enterprise.

In 1977 he was one of the founding members of Charter 77. After the OF [Civic Forum] was founded, he was a member of the OF council, and from 8 January 1990 he was the prosecutor general of the Czech Republic. Since

27 June 1990 he has been deputy premier of the Government of the CSFR, commissioned with the federal legislature and liaison with the Federal Assembly of the CSFR, the governments of the republics, and with the national councils.

Between 1970 and 1989 he published through samizdat and abroad. He is the leading author of the first draft of the Czechoslovak constitution, submitted by the Civic Forum.

[RESPEKT] Recently at a press conference you stated that "the Federation will survive." That is an optimistic and encouraging prognosis; nevertheless, not only the wave of separatism in Slovakia, but also the increased demands of the governments of the republics seem to indicate the opposite trend. Could you tell us what you yourself consider to be the essential features of a federation, which must not be abandoned in the interest of the "sovereignty and strength" of the individual republics?

[Rychetsky] The threads spun between the Czechs and Slovaks, just like the relations between the national and federal levels, have proved to be very fragile. I have not changed my conviction that we will succeed in preserving a unified state. However, I am afraid that the events of the hot summer in Trencianske Teplice, Ruzomberok, and elsewhere were not the last crisis in the coexistence of our nations. I consider it to be untenable that discussions about basic questions of our future are held solely on the level of the individual governments, often only on the level of the republic governments—without the participation of the federal government. The basic principles of the constitutional structure of the state and the delimitation of jurisdiction, even if solely in the sphere of executive power, should primarily be the subject of debates between the political representatives of both nations. Thus the decision of the president of the republic to convene such a meeting of the governing coalition for 28 October was a decisive step to preserve the state as a joint home for both nations and all nationalities living in it. But a unified state must not remain a mere slogan, which everyone avows, and at the same time makes demands through which the principles of a federal structure are threatened or even denied. Moreover, it is not a matter of working one's way toward a kind of "minimum federation" by way of systematic compromises. In my opinion it is neither dignified nor acceptable that the controversy about the federation be guided by the national governments through demands on the Federal agencies. We created a unified state in 1918 and it became a federation in 1968. It is a matter of a unified state of all citizens which, even in its new form, must be the expression of their will as citizens of Czechoslovakia, not the result of squabbling over jurisdiction.

I consider sovereignty to be an absolutely inalienable feature of a federation. Therefore it must be the only entity representing all citizens both in international relations, and in a defined area of jurisdiction. This, of course, presupposes that a body, elected in direct and

general elections, will act as the supreme constitutive and legislative committee. Its constitutive and legislative actions must have direct effect throughout the territory of the state and naturally, as actions of a higher legal force, must be placed above the laws of the national councils. In this connection it will be necessary to deal with the former extremely complex, and basically undemocratic, process of adopting some constitutional and other acts, whereby one-tenth of all members of both parliaments, as long as they were elected to the national parliament in one of the republics, can outvote all others. Personally, I believe that the cumbersome system of the present operation of parliament is untenable, and I lean toward the idea of a single chamber where a simple majority of the members elected in the relevant republic would be required to adopt an act. In view of the deep-rooted parliamentary tradition in our country, the Federal Government should continue to be chosen from the parliament, and thus from the results of parliamentary elections. In accordance with the prerequisite of respect for the principles of division of power and their mutual equilibrium, I attribute considerable significance to the creation of control mechanisms and interactive bonds between executive and legislative power. That means strengthening the function of the president of the republic who, within the framework of the new constitutional model, should also be a kind of arbiter between the government and the parliament, and by expanding his right to dissolve parliament if there are constitutional conflicts or a legislative emergency. It would be a modified model of representative democracy as we know it from the present French Republic, including the possibility of directly electing the head of state. An integrating element of the state would not only be strong legislation on the federal level, but also the access of every citizen to the constitutional federal court in matters regarding appeals concerning the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution.

[RESPEKT] The most recent events apparently demonstrated the failure of Premier Meciar's policies, where many questionable, nationally influenced steps were justified by the Slovak team as being necessary to weaken the position of the separatists in the SNS [Slovak National Party]. However, in the shadow of these policies, the Slovak National Party became extraordinarily popular and found empathy among the public. What do you think about this?

[Rychetsky] I believe that the policies of the Slovak Government, which strove to inhibit the most strident displays of nationalism, cannot unequivocally be described as a failure. We do not know what Slovakia would be like if these policies did not exist, situation could, in fact be much worse. I myself believe it would be worse.

The Slovak Government, like any other government, had to gauge the climate of its country, and react to it by adopting the majority of the national demands as its own. I emphasize that we could have already noticed this in the spring, since the preelection program of the VPN [Public Against Violence] was drawn up in this spirit.

[RESPEKT] Was there any sign at the meeting in Slavkov that the Slovak representatives realized how untenable their former vacillation was? Did they formulate their profederation stance more clearly?

[Rychetsky] The answer to this can be found in the Slavkov declaration. I believe it is very significant. Just as it is said that the Pittsburgh and Martin declarations were a part of the birth of our state, I would like to believe that this declaration will play a decisive role at the moment when the further existence and continuity of this state is at stake.

The main theme of the Slavkov meeting was the president's serious fear about the survival of Czechoslovakia. V. Havel even considered whether we should create the constitutional prerequisites to hold a referendum, i.e., to investigate the true status of public opinion, undistorted either by pressures from that radical—though in my opinion still very much minority—group that demonstrated in some Slovak town squares, or by pressure from politicians. We must bear in mind that there are a number of people on the Slovak political scene who appear completely differently in public than they do in private. Obviously they are under pressure by the public, they are afraid of losing popularity, and this affects their decision making. The possibility for every citizen to express his opinion about the future of this country in a secret ballot could neutralize this situation to a certain extent. However, at the Slavkov meeting we did not agree that the situation was ripe to hold a referendum. But, as I have already said, we adopted a declaration, the significance of which goes far beyond all previous steps supporting Czechoslovak reciprocity. This declaration could in itself become a kind of referendum. In Slavkov it was signed by eight people. I am sure that by spring millions of signatures from both Republics will appear on it.

[RESPEKT] Do you think that the declaration will be binding for the signatories?

[Rychetsky] The declaration is the title of a text that is extremely binding from the moral aspect. At the same time, it is not able to express the true complexity of the relations. It merely expresses the basic idea—in this case, the desire for a unified state. Essentially I know that all future negotiations will be as painful and intense as they have been so far. I know that creating an optimal model of a unified state while preserving both territorial integrity and the inalienable elements of the federation, is a process that will take many years. In the near future, I still expect a number of crises which, I still hope, we will overcome through mutual tolerance and understanding.

[RESPEKT] Sometimes it seems that the federal agencies do not have a clear conception why or within which limits one should defend the idea of a unified Czechoslovakia? What, in your opinion, is the main argument for preserving the Federation? What could the consequences be if the state were dismembered?

[Rychetsky] Czechoslovakia was—at least in the first half of this century in Central Europe—rightly called an oasis of democracy. Our international status and authority grew

considerably during the first months following 17 November last year. The cultural world, in particular, remarked on some appearances by President Havel on the international forum as being a significant moral appeal to world politics. The disintegration of our state would, on an international scale, turn Central and Eastern Europe's attempts to return to the family of democratic countries into a fiasco. It would also be an unmistakable sign of the start of intense Balkanization in this part of Europe. Nor should the internal impacts in respect to the integration of both economies and the close alliance of both nations be underestimated. On the other hand, one must not approach the problem of our coexistence merely from a sentimental point of view. There are limits that must not be crossed. One of them, for example, would be if one of the national councils proclaimed the sovereignty of its laws over the territories of the pertinent Republic and their superiority over the standards of the Federal Assembly. Yet I am also convinced that the disintegration of a unified state would not be permanent. The natural integration process in Europe will, sooner or later, also affect the former East Bloc.

[RESPEKT] In connection with the Czech-Slovak problems, one often talks of the violation of agreed obligations by the Slovak party which, allegedly, has not kept its word and keeps increasing its demands. On the other hand, for instance, one is familiar with the affair of the French and Brazilian presidents' visits, when the Slovak Government, specifically Premier Meciar, felt insulted by Prague's disparaging attitude and did not hesitate to make it public. There is no doubt that this indicates a certain amount of tension. Will the "authenticity" of the federation, about which we hear so much, resolve these complaints and conflicts? In what way will this federation make provision for Moravia, which is becoming increasingly emancipated? Actually, that is an additional question: What do you think about the unexpected increased in "Moravian nationalism," which is represented and encouraged by some representatives of the Society for Moravia and Silesia?

[Rychetsky] I ascribe the various disagreements or misunderstanding that you have mentioned to the malfunctioning mechanism in the relations between the various levels of state institutions. Apart from that, there really is a different view of the joint effort on the part of Slovakia, Bohemia, and Moravia (Silesia). I believe that we must—always and under all circumstances—be able to reflect the specifics of our partner's view and to eliminate national bias from possibly conflicts. In my eyes, the considerations about the federation as a functioning model of the legal state order of two nations is the same kind of technical problem as, for instance, a project for a nuclear reactor. I think that I was the first to use the term "authentic federation"—at the first meeting with the VPN delegation in the Laterna Magika in November 1989. I had in mind the process of creating the desire for a unified state on the part of both national representations, while bearing in mind the existence of a unified state and recognizing constitutional principles. If we question the existing constitutional framework, we would thereby also question the legitimacy of the already existing national and federal agencies of state power.

I consider the Moravian-Silesian problem to be serious from the point of view of state law. So far, in our country, there is an unquestioned principle that the national element is the element that creates the state. It is not the only possible principle and from the point of view of dualism it is not even the most propitious, but it exists in fact and cannot be denied. No country can repudiate its own history and origins. Considering this fact, I do not believe any alternative to be realistic, other than the resolution of regional, economic, and cultural autonomy of Moravia and Silesia within the framework of the Czech Republic. The scope and subject matter of this autonomy, however, should not be determined by extreme separatist trends, but by the true dimensions of the problem. For example, on the basis of qualified research of public opinion.

[RESPEKT] After the debate on the law on so-called small privatization, all the premiers and the president appeared in the media so that, irrespective of the adopted joint decision, they could tell the public their private opinion of the problem. What do you think about this "private" or "citizens'" action, whereby a politician openly makes statements that are opposed to the joint decision of the government of which he is a member?

[Rychetsky] Your question correctly emphasizes the need for the mutual loyalty of the members of the government, as a collective political authority. However, at the same time, almost all media are trying to ferret out any disharmony or differences in the opinion of the person being interviewed from the others by posing questions that I would describe as meddlesome. It is a sensitive problem related to the conflict between preserving personal integrity of opinions, obligatory loyalty, and respect for adopted decisions. In an extreme situation such a conflict must lead to resignation from membership in an agency, which outvotes me and enforces a will with which I cannot come to terms. The examples you have given, luckily, are not so extreme. The question of preference in regard to small privatization was not decisive. Moreover, the individuals who submitted the proposal for the law expected there would be preferences; it was merely a matter of the form. And one tends to forget that the president's proposal, which only received minority support, was exclusively motivated by the fear that otherwise small privatization would not succeed, since there simply would not be enough interested parties to purchase the places of business in question. The individual comments on the state of crude oil or gasoline reserves, and particularly their inconsistency were undoubtedly the result of a lack of coordination. I think that one of the basic problems of the political system that is being created is bad communications. All of us suffer from the lack of time and the inability clearly to establish a sequence of priorities. If I felt serious reservations about some of my colleagues' statements, I told them directly. I see no reason to make them public in the media.

[RESPEKT] The past days have been marked by Minister Klaus' advancement. What, in your opinion, is the significance of his election to head the OF by more than a two-thirds majority of the delegates?

[Rychetsky] Unequivocally, the moment arrived when a free and insufficiently structured movement felt the need for internal change. I consider this to be a positive moment. I have constantly emphasized the fact that the period of dissidence and tearing down the state has ended. To the contrary, we now bear responsibility for the state and its development toward democracy and a market economy. If, for the time being, we are unable to create a political party, we must at least learn to behave like a political party on the elementary level. I consider Vaclav Klaus' election to be one of the first steps toward this.

[RESPEKT] In the Western press there was speculation about disagreements between the Hrad [Castle] and the minister of finance; there are even rumors about disagreements between Mr. Klaus and you. If such disagreements exist, can you tell us what they are about?

[Rychetsky] It is up to the people involved to clarify the relations between the Hrad and V. Klaus—presuming they consider it to be necessary. My relations with Minister Klaus are on two levels—we cooperate closely as members of the government, and our interests coincide: to share in emphasizing the government's authority and ability to take action as the supreme executive office of state power. Membership in the same political movement demands that our relations be considerably closer; it is no longer merely a matter of loyalty issuing from the state office. It is a matter of shared responsibility for the implementation of a joint program. In creating such a program, I believe it to be necessary for disagreements to exist, in order to be able to consider all problems that arise from various angles. A plurality of opinions is a necessary prerequisite not only for democratic society as a whole, but also for the democratic creation of political ideas and lines within the framework of the Civic Forum. However, it must not become limitless. There must always come a time when we feel bound by clearly stated conclusions. Therefore it is difficult for me to give you a clear answer to the question as to what the disagreements, which have so far not occurred, are about. But I believe that, for example, on the question and Czechoslovak reciprocity Vaclav Klaus' point of view differs somewhat from mine. I emphasize the closest possible cooperation with the VPN, while I believe that the head of the OF is emphasizing the independence of our movement.

[RESPEKT] Could you state your opinion on the causes of the present crisis in the Civic Forum? Do you believe the new leader will be able to resolve this crisis?

[Rychetsky] I believe the Civic Forum's problem results from the lack of vertical and horizontal structures which we would all recognize. This gives rise to a further problem: lack of communication—the absolute lack of clarification of the relations of the OF's agencies, i.e., the advisory board, the council, and the parliament, to the members of the OF in the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council. Which group is the most legitimate? How can one ascertain their interaction? We do not lack a clear political program. We got rid of the most

visible part of totalitarianism, we want to implement a radical economic reform, and with its help eliminate the remnants of totalitarianism and create the basic prerequisites for the functioning of a legal state and democratic society of self-confident citizens. Now we must find effective means to implement this program. I am convinced that the election of V. Klaus as the Head of the OF was the choice of one of these means.

[RESPEKT] Often today one talks about the fact that one must not disgrace people merely for being members of the Communist Party, that one must not organize witch hunts. But in a recent television denunciation member Zeman substantiated the alleged political and moral unsuitability of Minister Klaus by pointing out that V. Klaus refused to sign a petition to release Vaclav Havel last year. Could this mean that, hand in hand with bewildered irresoluteness as to how one should punish direct, and to considerable extent well-known offenders, people guilty of the destruction of the state and society, we will screen more and more harshly those people who may have refused to sign a protest at some time? Can you, the classical dissident and one of the first signatories of Charter 77, remember any time during the thirteen year existence of this citizen's initiative, when anyone was accused of a lack of courage to sign a petition?

[Rychetsky] We must judge people by their moral and professional qualities. Naturally, not only from the point of view of today's attitudes, but from the point of view of attitudes and particularly actions through which they, so to speak, entered history. In the framework of the association created by Charter 77, the principles I always valued most highly were tolerance, mutual respect, and deference for different opinions. I am very perturbed that we did not succeed in transferring this spirit from the Charter to the Civic Forum. In the Charter we did not hunt for paragons of courage nor did we reproach people for being less willing to undergo personal risk. To the contrary, the Charter attempted to address other citizens through ethical actions and to awaken the feeling of citizenship in them. I am still trying to uphold these principles. Personally, I believe that the most important basis is teamwork and purposeful existence is the principle of loyalty. As a member of the government, I like the feeling of allegiance to others. Otherwise, I simply could not remain in the government. In the same way, in past years I considered the feeling of allegiance to my country to be most important, and I did not leave even when I was threatened with a loss of qualifications and personal liberty. I consider the principle of loyalty in this sense to be the principle of identity. Therefore, please permit me to conclude by expressing my credo: In the relations of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians, in the relations of the parliament and government, in the relations of various political parties and movements, or simply within the framework of our own human and social dimension, let us always seek what unites us. Let us recognize our differences, and respect our adversaries. Only human pride and dignity, decency and tolerance will enable us to overcome the worst times.

**Head of New Intelligence Agency Interviewed**

91CH0150A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech  
30 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Eng. Jiri Mueller, director of the Office for Protection of the Constitution and Democracy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, by Jan Kastanek; place and date not given: "What Is at Stake and What Will Continue To Be at Stake in the Secret Service"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party at its recent meeting expressed concern over the current political situation in the country. It also drew attention to the Office for Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy by pointing out that here is a concentration of great power without any kind of parliamentary control. Representatives of this institution asked our editors for the opportunity to explain their positions. Today, we therefore present the interview we had with Eng. Jiri Mueller, director of the Office for Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

[Kastanek] Mister Director, the Office for Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy is part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It seems that it is precisely this fact which led the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party to make the above-mentioned criticism and that similar fears are being expressed even by a portion of the broader public. Can you explain to whom the leadership of the office accounts for its activities and give us your ideas regarding possible parliamentary or other types of control?

[Mueller] It is a fact that, in the program proclamation of the government, the intent is expressed to separate the Office for Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior from the Federal Ministry of the Interior so as to distribute power. This will be one of the guarantees of the democratic political system in Czechoslovakia. It is another fact that this separation has been taking a long time. As far as the Office for Protection of the Constitution is concerned, I must say that we ardently wish that it be made independent. There are many good reasons for this in addition to the principal reason, that is to say, the institutional guarantee of democracy and the fact that we are now hampered by many regulations which are applicable within the Ministry of the Interior and, thus, also apply to us. Similarly, we are subordinated to units of the Ministry of the Interior which have not been subjected to any vetting at all and this gives rise to certain problems.

However, separation from the Federal Ministry of the Interior is subject to the following conditions. First, a law must be created by which the office would be constituted in line with new and generally acceptable principles. We have prepared such a law and were able to turn it over to the legislature as early as the beginning of September. However, we have no influence upon the duration of this process; in my opinion, it is far too long and is subject to unnecessary delays. We would be

immensely happy if parliament and the appropriate parliamentary committees would make the effort to speed up this process. I would like to stress that we have no need to operate without parliamentary control. Precisely the opposite is true: We solicit control.

At present, the leadership of the office accounts for its activities to the federal minister of the interior; if the law is approved, we will be accountable to parliament. Control is proposed at two levels. On the one hand, parliament will oversee the efficiency of the work performed by the entire office, that is to say, it will check whether the expended funds result in responsible commensurate work—parliament should not be approving the budget for the Federal Service for Protection of the Constitution (we should actually be called that)—and secondly, it will be checking on our activities. We assume that it will establish a more narrow committee which would be devoted exclusively to the federal service. It would primarily have access to all directives and orders which will be issued within the federal service; in the proposed law, some of these are specifically identified, for example: the directive on the means of intelligence, on recordkeeping, on the general aims of activities.

[Kastanek] Insofar as the separation of the office or some of its components from the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior is concerned, it will be necessary to establish certain rules of collaboration with this ministry, something which is probably essential in the sphere of intelligence and counterintelligence activities. How should such collaboration be configured?

[Mueller] In the event the office is separated, it will, of course, be necessary to establish rules of cooperation with many organizations and institutions. Relationships which function within the Federal Ministry of the Interior will be disrupted by the separation of the office and it will be necessary to reestablish these relationships on a firm contractual basis. As far as activities are concerned, a specific situation arises when it comes to cooperation as a result of a totally different type of activity engaged in by the office, in comparison to the state security apparatus. The latter essentially controlled an entire chain reaction of events from the initial signal all the way through imprisonment of an individual. The authorities granted to the office will be completely different. It will be an intelligence service without police powers and without investigative powers, as is listed in the proposed law. This means that these activities will be engaged in by other components which will be subordinated to the federal or republic ministries of the interior. At various levels, however, the question continues to be discussed as to whether the activities of the office will not be paralyzed because it is not equipped with any police powers. We shall, among other areas, be active in the field of drugs and terrorism and here it can actually happen that, if we do not have the power, for example, to identify individual identities or to confiscate objects, our employees will not be able to make any effective incursions. I believe that this question will become a subject of parliamentary debate.

[Kastanek] The Czechoslovak intelligence service had a good reputation in the past and recorded some good results—for example, prior to World War II and during World War II. It proved its professional caliber even during the totalitarian Communist regime. Will you make use of this tradition, and if so, how? Will you be initiating collaborative relationships with special services of other nations? What is the current relationship between your institution and the KGB?

[Mueller] We have ambitions for the Federal Service for Protection of the Constitution to tie in to the good reputation enjoyed by the Czechoslovak intelligence service prior to World War II and to do so in two areas. On the one hand, insofar as results are concerned and, on the other hand, insofar as the reputation within society is concerned. I believe that during the first republic an intelligence officer was a person who was regarded with respect. The state security apparatus, which operated in this area over the past 40 years, however, brought about a situation in which, today, citizens regard the intelligence service primarily with suspicion and insecurity.

With whom shall we collaborate? We are prepared to initiate relationships with all special services. It must be remembered that at the moment that borders are opened this type of collaboration can simply not be avoided. As far as the KGB is concerned, official relationships with that organization exist at the level of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. We are now primarily interested in the results of collaboration between the KGB and the state security apparatus, of which I would perhaps only mention that the state security apparatus passed on the results of its work and its data on its agent net to its partners in the USSR.

[Kastanek] One topical question in conclusion. The federal minister of the interior ordered the dissolution of the intelligence service and transferred its employees to the active reserve. Does this not signify a paralyzing of this type of collaboration over a longer period of time? What are the principles on which the new intelligence service will possibly be established? Is it at least approximately possible to characterize future external and internal methods—in other words, counterintelligence operations?

[Mueller] I would not like to comment on the orders of my superior. However, as far as the methods of counterintelligence work are concerned, they have undergone many changes compared to the methods used by the state security apparatus. Primarily, state security operated with the aid of an in-place agent network with the idea that it is necessary to have someone everywhere. Of course, we in no way renounce working with an agent net—this is really not even possible if we are to have the kind of mission which is outlined for us in the proposed law. However, for us, clandestine agents represent only one of many methods of our work, a method which will, by far, not be the most important. If, in the state security apparatus, a good intelligence officer was characterized by the number of agents he ran, here, the best one will be

the individual who will have the most information. And information can be acquired by very different means, for example, from overtly accessible sources. The CIA, for example, acquires 80 percent of its information from the press. The state security apparatus operated in a highly extensive manner, it was interested in capturing everything and in processing everything. It basically represented one of the control mechanisms of society. In a democratic political system, however, totally different public control mechanisms exist and this also means that the area in which the intelligence service functions is narrowed. We will be active only where there is secret, clandestine activity which threatens the Constitution, the state, individual rights, and the freedom of our citizens. The federal service, of course, must not intervene in the internal political life. We will devote ourselves strictly to cases in which the internal political life is threatened by extremism. This is a situation, for example, in which the function of constitutional officials might be threatened by violence, be it the president, members of the legislature, or members of the government. Or situations where, for racial or nationalist reasons, the rights and freedoms of individuals are threatened. Then the intelligence services must act. In our opinion, it is possible to prevent the misuse of the federal services in domestic political affairs only by vesting control in parliament, to be exercised not only by one party or those parties who are victorious in the elections, but also by those parties in opposition. It is only in this way that it is possible, on the one hand, to obtain a sufficiently broad base and support for the work of the federal service and, on the other hand, it is only in this way that it is possible to be rid of the suspicion that this service would be utilized by one group against another. We are attempting to apply these principles even in the proposal of the law constituting the Federal Service for Protection of the Constitution.

Editors' Note: Collaboration with the office and its representatives was rapid and completely correct. To the extent that some of the responses will not appear completely exhaustive, it is logical; after all, what is involved here is a special service with secretive facts and, moreover, the office is not involved in positive intelligence, which is a matter for other organizations. It would appear that the question of parliamentary control is a question primarily for parliament itself. We welcome the expression of Director Mueller in which he stated that parliament should apply control over the activities of the service not through the governing party alone, but also through the parties in opposition.

#### Editor Comments on Dobrovsky's Appointment as Defense Minister

91CH0108A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 6 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "Soldier and Civilian"]

[Text] Is naming Lubos Dobrovsky minister of defense really the best solution to the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia? Would it not be better for General of the Army Vacek, a loyal professional who is thoroughly

knowledgeable in the problems of his field, to stay in the job? These questions are now being raised by people who are well aware of what a sensitive position the Armed Forces have in domestic policies.

Let us therefore first try to analyze what role General Vacek played in the democratization of the Army. His superior, President Havel, rates it as more or less positive: "The extensive changes which await the Army were begun during the period when he has been in that position. Minister Vacek very loyally carries out all orders. His removal is therefore not an act of personal mistrust of him, but an expression of the political necessities of the moment." L. Dobrovský looks on his work in a similar way: "I consider General Vacek to be a man who did a great deal for the stabilization of the Army at the highest level of skill in an extremely complicated period." The third of the evaluations, that given by the Military Renewal Association, differs somewhat: "Minister Vacek did not show himself capable, we believe, of dealing with the burden of the 20-year normalization period despite an honest effort and the trust which was given to him. He did not completely understand the requirements of the changes taking place in our society."

General Vacek's approach to changes in the Army can be illustrated by his attitude to the establishment of the Inspector General's office, an agency for the control of the Army which would answer only to the parliament. At the beginning of the year he simply rejected it and since March he has recommended that the IG be formed from the existing Army inspector's office; in August he finally accepted the concept of setting up the Inspector General in accordance with the requirements of the defense and security committee of the Federal Assembly which experts have been proposing since the beginning of the year.

The constantly repeated statement that General of the Army Vacek carries out orders in an exemplary manner is simply absurd. Not to execute orders is a violation of military regulations and cause for punishment; for a minister it could be, for example, removal from office. The job of minister also does not require just carrying out orders, but also initiative, ideas, the formulation of concepts. Nobody denies that certain changes have taken place in the Army since 17 November, probably quite sufficient from the viewpoint of the leadership and some officers. From the standpoint of informed citizens and civilian experts, they are insufficient.

The public has not learned of any concept for transforming the Army in keeping with the political changes. There has been vague talk about a three-stage process of professionalization which is to be completed in 2005. In the meantime, thousands of officers and warrant officers have returned to civilian life when they learned that the old cadre personnel are staying in the command positions. According to General Vacek, however, only 20 percent of the truly competent soldiers have left. Who did their evaluations? Civilian service for basic service

soldiers has become a great problem both for the Army and for the civilian organizations which provide alternative service. More recruits and soldiers are requesting it than the ministry expected. There is some indefinite talk about a change in military doctrine (even though to a large extent this is a matter of policy). Morale was never good in the units and is getting even worse.

The removal of Minister Vacek was necessary not only because of the information of the commission dealing with the Army's activities at the end of November 1989. It was also necessary because his understanding of the humanization and democratization of the Army did not give any guarantee of sufficiently rapid changes.

Lubos Dobrovský, currently a deputy minister of foreign affairs, was named minister of defense. We will again let President Havel speak: "Mister Dobrovský is a deliberate and wise person, but at the same time a decisive and energetic one who enjoys authority among the general officers and the officer corps."

It is, of course, still too early to evaluate the work of the new minister. Nonetheless, his first order on stopping the activities of the Free Legions caused contradictory reactions. As he himself admits, he is just now getting acquainted with the way the Army runs. It is entirely certain that he has not had the opportunity to judge objectively the activities of the Free Legions. As a minister he has the right to stop the activities of all organizations operating in the Army and he apparently wants to do that. His decisiveness arouses sympathy in its own way. But why has he so far selected only the Legion and left the others to keep on operating? He moreover asked the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy to investigate the activities of the Free Legions and "took personnel actions on the representatives and other members of the SL (Free Legions)." It is paradoxical that many of them were among the founders of Military Forums in December (which indisputably played a positive role) and, for example, Lt. Col. Praus was not afraid of joining the Prague KC OF [Civic Forum commission] as early as the end of November—as the sole officer in military uniform—and even spoke several times there with the minister of defense at that time. In this case we will set aside the question of just what the nearly nonfunctioning Agency for the Protection of the Constitution can resolve. The members of SL have never concealed their activities and have worked entirely in the open. Detective work thus would not be any great problem.

In a meeting with journalists L. Dobrovský announced that he had heard about the statement of one member of SL, "The minister of defense a civilian and a signatory of Charter 77 That is not possible." Even if someone did in fact say that, it is his personal opinion and not an official pronouncement of the Free Legions. A week after his first order the minister said on the grounds of the parliament, "I assume that the period of halting the activities of SL will be as brief as possible, that those who were put into the personnel reserves will not have their

pay docked, and that the entire affair will be resolved as quickly as possible so that everything positive which the SL activities can include in and bring to the Army will be included in and brought to the Army..." The general officer corps, according to Mister Dobrovsky, had stacks of proposals for initiatives prepared for the day when he took the job. Who knows whether stopping the activities of SL was one of them.

The minister of defense does not have an easy job. The majority of the current top military representatives worked in their high-level jobs in the Army before November. He must find the most capable and most loyal ones among them and gradually remove the others. He does not, however, want to get into any purges. As he himself says, there is nobody with whom to replace them. He therefore wants to send 25 officers in command positions on a tour of the West. Of those who were recommended to him, only one met all the requirements (knowledge of language, rank). On whom should he lean? The defense and security committee of the parliament is not concerned with just the Army. A possible solution would be the creation of a certain corps of consultants who would help at the start (but there are certainly no positions for them in the table of organization).

It is far from just a matter of the communist past of the command personnel. Two intelligence services operate in the Army, a defensive one and an offensive one. The first one is 75 percent made up of former State Security personnel and the other, which works under the General Staff, has undergone practically no changes since November. L. Dobrovsky has to deal with a new military budget, new deployment of units, and the gradual semi-professionalization of the Army. The earlier that the public will be acquainted with the proposals (published with due regard for military secrecy, naturally, but nonetheless published), the better.

The castle or the government believes that L. Dobrovsky has all the moral prerequisites to perform the job of minister, but this does still not mean that he will do a professional job. We will learn whether he will by how rapidly he gets oriented, how he will utilize his authority, and how he gains authority among the rank and file soldiers and noncommissioned officers. And the quality of his work will be most visible in the changes made in our Army.

#### **Editor Views Controversial Cases of Soviet Army Deserters**

91CH0146A Prague *FORUM* in Czech 6 Nov 90 p 10

[Article by Beata Bernikova: "Order From Moscow: Emigration Forbidden!"]

[Text]

#### **The First Ones**

On 17 April 1990, Alexandre Vitalijevic Masljajev, USSR citizen and soldier in the Soviet Army, presented himself in the Office of the President of the Republic and asked to be granted political asylum in the CSFR. By asking for political asylum, Masljajev demonstrated his regard for the CSFR and at the same time expressed his opinion of the stationing of Soviet troops on our territory. Not only was he not granted the asylum, but on 18 April 1990 he was turned over to the Soviet authorities, allegedly on the basis of a 1968 agreement concerning the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on our territory. The response from our side is startling, especially if we consider that we are talking about the administration of President Vaclav Havel. We can in fact only speculate about the subsequent fate of Private Masljajev, but after hearing several versions from various sources of what happened to him, and knowing the punishments meted out by the Soviet Army which, although kept secret are nevertheless known, the concern about Masljajev is justified. General Vorobjov, USSR Government official in charge of the Soviet troops withdrawal, spoke about what happened to Masljajev: "After being turned over to the Soviet Command, Masljajev was not prosecuted or otherwise held accountable. On 16 June he was transferred to the USSR, and at this time is serving in the Turkestan military district. This statement can be verified by Czechoslovak reporters who, as far as I know, have visited his family in the USSR."

The reporters who visited Masljajev's family did not verify this statement, on the contrary, they expressed further doubts. Masljajev's address is not known; his parents claimed that he is the commander of a cultural unit in Alma-Alta, and said that he keeps in touch with them only by telephone. When Mr. Kvasnicka, director of Short Film Praha, wanted to film his photographs with his camera, they did not allow it. A week after the visit of Mr. Kvasnicka, a reporter from LIDOVE NOVINY spoke with Masljajev's father. The father told him that he published a statement in the Soviet press that private Masljajev did not ask for political asylum in our country.

All of the facts concerning the handing over of Masljajev were not yet ascertained when private Temnikov, who ran away from a Soviet garrison on 24 September, was detained by border guards of the former GDR and turned over to our authorities. Quick as lightning, without informing the Federal Ministry of Interior, he was returned by our side to Lt. Col. Pocekajev from the Soviet base. The Federal Ministry of Interior learned

about the case only when it was already too late. When a commission of the Federal Ministry of Interior began to investigate the case, they were told by Lt. Col. Pocekajev and Major Inapkin that they cannot talk to Temnikov because he is no longer in the CSFR. Two days later at a press conference arranged by the Soviet Army, General Vorobjov pointed to a blond, pale youngster: "He is here in front of you. He made no statement about requesting political asylum. So why is so much fuss made about him?"

The first two cases mentioned in the press have been closed. Perhaps that also marks the end of the indifferent attitude of our authorities in handing over Soviet deserters, and true to the legacy of humanitarianism we have begun to admit them to refugee camps. Several days went by, and then the Soviet side began to act up for a change.

#### The Abolence Case

Petr Abolencev, before the Soviets got to him, said: "I felt like a human being here. I want to write to my parents. I know they will have nothing good to say about it, but I want to live in the CSFR as a normal citizen. Maybe if the political situation at home changes I will go back, but now I want to live here." His story began to unfold when he became a soldier and was assigned to a military counterespionage unit. A sensitive young man who abhorred any kind of violence, he was forced to hunt people. General Vorobjov described Petr's case to us as follows: "Through the military prosecutor's office of the Czechoslovak Army we learned that Private Abolencev was detained on 3 September by Public Security, and allegedly asked for political asylum. From a CSFR Government official we learned that Private Abolencev was in the Institute for Military Education of the Ministry of Interior, in Zastavka u Brna. The Commander of the Central Army Group, as the Government representative, request the CSFR Government representative to turn Abolencev over to the Central Army Group, or to provide an opportunity to meet with him. The CSFR official expressed regret, but denied the request. On 1 October we informed the office of the CSFR Government that Abolencev's parents have arrived and expressed the wish to meet with him and resolve his case through the intermediary of the Federal Ministry of Interior. From the office of the CSFR Government representative came the answer that the parents can meet with their son in the refugee camp."

The press spokesman for the office in charge of refugee matters, Mr. Fendrych, said that his office did not receive any request for a meeting of Soviet Army representatives with Abolencev, and was very surprised at where his parents, who did not go through passport

control at the camp, came from. Petr Abolencev took shelter in the refugee camp, accepted the offered request for political asylum, and had this to say about a meeting with Soviet authorities: "I have nothing to talk to them about."

On the tape recording Petr's voice sounded assured, his words thoughtful. When he was hiding in the forests, he had the opportunity along with his friend to think about his future. I would not call Petr's act a result of a confused mind, as he later told me rather vaguely at the press conference.

The more than strange actions of the Soviet authorities began with the arrival of Petr's parents. The parents were brought by a Soviet charter plane and did not go through passport control. In their statements, the father and General Vorobjov disagreed about the date when the telegram about Petr's desertion was received. The father insisted that he received the telegram on 24 August and General Vorobjov maintained that the parents received it on 16 August. The parents themselves sent a telegram to the regiment in order to learn more details. A month and a half later, on 26 September, they reportedly received a telephone call from Major General Tausanov. "He told us that Petr was alive and well, and that it would be a good thing if we went to Czechoslovakia. I asked him to have a telegram sent to us stating that Petr was ill, in order to expedite the issuance of passports. We arrived in the CSFR on 30 September and on 2 October we got in touch with our son." In this connection it is startling how quickly, among other things, the Soviet authorities complied with the alleged wishes of the parents. Representatives of the Soviet Army took great pains to take care of an alleged request of two simple people, going so far as to fly them by a chartered Soviet military plane. They did not act quite as humanely when they paraded the devastated mother together with the father and Petr like tamed animals at the press conference. The mother cried all the time and did not manage to utter a single coherent word throughout the entire conference. The father spoke with difficulty and appeared tired. And Petr looked like a man resigned to anything. That is nothing new. Staged processes with a precise scenario of forced testimonies are very well known to us.

The tape recording reveals the tragedy of the life of Soviet soldiers here; to think his answer through to its logical conclusion fills one with dread. "I was afraid of people. In training they kept telling us that we are the liberators and that all around us are enemies." At the press conference he replied to the same question: "I had good relations with people. They helped me." Asked why he in fact deserted, why he wandered around and did not aim for the Soviet border, he replied: "We were running away as far as we could from those units, because I had experience as an intelligence agent."

At the press conference he said that they did not know where they were, where the Soviet Union was. His previous testimony and then his answers at the press conference give us a picture of the demagoguery which the Soviet Army still teaches its soldiers on our territory. Director Kvasnicka asked the Soviet Embassy for a meeting with Petr after his departure from the camp. Not only did they not arrange a meeting with him, he was not even invited to the press conference although he was the only person who spoke with Petr in the camp. Nor were representatives of the Office for Refugees of the Ministry of Interior invited to the conference, perhaps so that the Soviet authorities would be able to lie without interference. And a last comment on the case of Petr Abolencev. One week after his departure for the USSR, the Soviet Army issued a statement that Petr Abolencev never asked for political asylum in the CSFR.

#### Going Too Far (?)

General Vorobjov talked smoothly about Sergeant Tachir Zaripov and Private Igor Naumov as criminals from whom he is duty bound to protect Czechoslovak citizens. Director Kvasnicka talked to both youngsters as soon as they arrived in the camp at Zastavka u Brna. They told him that they are ashamed of what they did (they broke into a grocery) and that it was a consequence of the bad treatment and lack of food in the Soviet garrison.

The idea of thinking about them as criminals came from the Soviet side. It is, of course, unthinkable that the delinquents should go unpunished for the theft. But much more important is the fact that on our soil there are foreign troops whose members do not know why they are here, where they are, who are treated badly, are hungry, and are taught that citizens of our country are enemies. Who is making criminals out of them? A somewhat dangerous play with words.

And then there are the activities of the Soviets on our territory. Not only do they school their soldiers in demagoguery which is dangerous to us, but in trying to get their deserters back they threaten them with the crudest terror. A proof of that is also the curious incident on 2 and 3 October in Zastavka u Brna. General Vorobjov said that the Czechoslovak press is distorting the facts, but he did not say which ones. We agree with him that the incident of the "civilians" on 2 and 3 October 1990 in Zastavka u Brna was high-handed. It seems highly improbable that there were tourists in the bus with a Soviet license plate and with drawn curtains which was parked by the Trebic road. Citizens of Zastavka u Brna as well as the policemen guarding the refugee camp are convinced that these "tourists" were a professionally trained, Russian-speaking unit with its own command, which was carrying out orders and which could most appropriately be called a commando unit. It is quite difficult to imagine that tourists would be carrying out an outflanking maneuver around the camp just at the time when Lt. Col. Lukanin and his driver were putting pressure on the camp commander to hand

over Naumov and Zaripov and at the same time threatened to shoot up the whole establishment. Director Kvasnicka added the following to this information: "The next day Zastavka u Brna was occupied by our rapid deployment unit, and I do not think that the Federal Ministry of Interior would be using a rapid deployment unit for protection against tourists. It is possible that all Soviet tourists who come to Czechoslovakia undergo special training, but what is certain is that our specially trained men were afraid of them. Several times as a tourist I searched in foreign countries for a lost friend. But I never succeeded in surrounding a refugee camp with my friends."

In explaining the appearance of the strange bus, General Vorobjov forgot about the GAZ [Soviet-manufactured truck] equipped with a radio station, the Soviet Army officer and the six men in civilian clothes.

From that it can be deduced that either General Vorobjov did not know about this action, in which case it means that Soviet units of unknown origin are operating on the sovereign territory of the CSFR, or he was in charge of it, and therefore the Command of the Central Soviet Army Group committed a crime against the CSFR.

Following this experience, when obviously the safety of at least two people was threatened, our Federal Ministry of Interior took both boys under its protection. The rapid deployment unit came and took them to an unknown destination, where they were to stay until a decision was made about their fate. However, the Soviet Army does not give up its soldiers that easily. It offers its embrace again. It could, of course, be an iron embrace, but that is only our assumption. Again, their mothers appeared here and asked their sons to return to their homeland. Boys, only a few days ago firmly determined to live in Czechoslovakia, where, as they testified, they felt like human beings, hesitate. A meeting of Igor Naumov and Tachir Zaripov with their mothers is arranged. The fathers are, in case the boys refuse to return to the disintegrating Soviet homeland, reportedly in prison. The confidential discussion without witnesses cannot proceed without scenes and again the curious assistance of units unknown to our authorities. Soviet automobiles surround the Ministry of Interior building and in the side streets Soviet uniforms are exchanged for civilian clothes. After one hour of mutual torment mothers and their sons leave the separate room. Both mothers are crying and refuse to talk to anybody. But in the end they do talk. The Representatives ask them whether any pressure has been put on them. Tachir Zaripov's mother is a little calmer, she has hope because her son asked for two days to think it over. Igor Naumov did not give in to pressure and is absolutely determined to stay. The mothers do not answer any questions and keep on repeating: "They must go home. If they want to live here they can come back, but now they must go home."

Sunday evening in a hotel room in Milovice I talk with the exhausted mothers. Tachirov's mother is listening to

what I am telling her, perhaps she would be willing to discuss it. She just asks: "Why are they holding them here?" When I want to explain to her that no one is holding her son here, Igor's mother calls the command headquarters. I have no time to explain anything.

On Monday at 16 hours Tachir Zaripov is signing a statement that he is giving up political asylum. When he hears General Vorobiov calling him a criminal on the tape recording of the ignominious press conference at the Soviet Embassy, he is momentarily taken aback. In the end he finishes his statement. Everybody is asking him if he really wants to go back. He says that he does not want to, but must because of his mother. And he adds something more. "I shall hang myself." The despair of the 20-year-old boy is boundless. As is the despair of his mother. He does not want to leave by himself and asks for someone from the Soviet garrison to come for him.

Igor Naumov is taken at his own request to the refugee camp in Zastavka u Brna. Everyone is already exhausted by these fights for human freedom and perhaps for life itself as well.

It is impossible to believe that the Soviet Army is so concerned about family and human happiness. We do not know exactly the coercive method which they used on the parents, but we were witnesses to the senseless psychological torment of the young men who wanted to try living in freedom. The only one who did not give in was Naumov.

Colonial powers always take a long time before they admit that their colonies are no longer colonies, and that on the territory of sovereign states they must therefore respect their laws. Human freedom is also a law of this country.

Report of the press spokesman for the government representative for refugee matters, Mr. Fendrych, of 17 October 1990: "Soviet soldier, Sergeant Igor Naumov, who was taken at his own request on 16 October 1990 to the refugee camp in Zastavka u Brna, decided to return to the USSR. On Wednesday, 17 October, at 0900, he was visited by his mother, Svetlana Nikolajevna Naumova, with whom he had already spoken last Friday. After her visit he announced that he is withdrawing his request for political asylum in the CSFR. He signed a statement to that effect and at 1015 hours was driven from the camp in a Volga car with Soviet license plates.

#### **Slovak Claims Concerning Redistribution of Funds Denied**

91CH0172A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech  
31 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Karel Kriz: "Let Us Say It Out Loud"]

[Text] A considerable portion of the Slovak press has been filled to excess, particularly in recent weeks, with half-truths, but most frequently with outright disinformation regarding the alleged extra costs incurred by the

Slovak economy in the face of the unified federal economic system. The Czech press has maintained a modest silence and, if something is written about economic problems in Slovakia as was done, for example, by our daily paper with respect to the conflicts which exist in Prievidza and at Ziar nad Hronom, then the argument used sticks strictly to economic criteria. However, in Slovakia, every problem is routinely politicized, as was recently demonstrated for us in the case of Ziar, not only by employees of the aluminum smelter, but, particularly, by Anton Vavro, the Slovak deputy minister of finance. He did not omit mentioning that, as a result of the indolence of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Slovak banks had invested 400 million korunas [Kcs] in Czech agriculture and then had a difficult time raising additional money specifically for Ziar.

As a professional, Mr. Vavro is surely familiar with the fact that during the entire period of postwar development enormous funds were flowing from the Czech lands to Slovakia. This redistribution peaked during the 1970's and, despite the fact that its level gradually declined, did not come to an end even after 17 November. Every hour, day, and night, virtually Kcs1 million flows from Bohemia and Moravia to Slovakia—Kcs20 million each day.

I ask what actually happened in Slovakia that a poor and economically backward region virtually became an equal economic partner with the Czech lands over a period of 40 years? Why did something similar not occur in the poor regions of a single other European country, beginning with Italy and Spain and ending with Yugoslavia? The facts are unrelentingly grim. The volume of investment in Slovakia averaged one-third more than that for the Czech lands for the entire postwar period as a result of the extensive redistribution of resources. It is therefore not surprising to find that the capital asset ratio (buildings, machinery, installations) in Slovak industry is 5 percent higher than that in Bohemia and Moravia. However, the per capita national income in these lands continues to be approximately 15 percent above the Slovak level, with average wages already virtually equal.

Enough. I know very well that there is no argument which blinded nationalists could accept. What is it that the Czechs have made out of Slovakia? Perhaps a Macedonia, I ask?

The subsidies which flowed and continue to flow to Slovakia and which had a clearly positive influence upon the entire economy until the end of the 1960's will soon come to an end. It will most likely turn out that Slovakia has lived beyond its means, in other words, beyond its own economic efficiency, and this will show up in the competitive economy in terms of higher unemployment and a slower pace of economic growth in comparison with the Czech plans. This will be yet another good playground for demagogues who fan the fires of nationalism.

Czech policy will be seriously tested. Will it solve the situation with additional subsidies and redistribution of resources or shall we reach prior agreement with Slovak democrats regarding such rules which will result in prosperity for the entire state as a result of the consistently economic channeling of investments?

### Assistance to Lusatian Sorbs Urged

91CH0172B Prague OBZORY in Czech No 20.  
1990 p 6

[Article by Dr. Josef Lebeda: "Lusatia and Unified Germany"]

[Text] The process of German unification is now culminating. Serious economic questions are in the forefront of the interest of the German public, both in the East and also in the West. The actual unification of Germany was also preceded by an agreement between both German states regarding economic, currency, and social union. The emphasis placed on the advantages of a capitalist market economy exerted primary influence (perhaps even more than nationalism) upon the results of this year's parliamentary elections in the GDR. In these elections, the Lusatian Sorbs also expressly favored the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] with their votes. This orientation was decisively influenced primarily by two factors, even though in and of themselves they contradict each other at first glance. On the one hand, it can be stated that for the believing Protestants and Catholics among the Lusatian Sorbs, which account for more than 90 percent of this entire small Slavic nation, an inclination toward the CDU will be a matter of course. But, at the same time, the rich offerings of a West German consumer society, together with a strong currency, the West German mark, plays a role here also.... However, Lusatian Sorb farmers, who again account for a majority within their nation, need not fear unemployment in a free labor market. They know very well that even in a unified Germany they will be managing for themselves, in their own settlements. Naturally, they are also attracted by the possibility of living in freedom, of having an expanded horizon of living opportunities. However, Lusatian Sorbs are very good managers, their villages stand out through their orderliness, their beauty and architectonic originality in comparison with other purely German villages in the vicinity. Briefly stated, they like to stay at home. Even in the past, in the forced conformity of the GDR, they formed an above-average economic, social, and cultural entity.

On the other hand, the negligible number of Lusatian Sorb Communists, who frequently governed in virtually unrestricted manner the so-called national institutions, is becoming aware of the definitive end of their doubtful glory. The pinkish journalists of the Slavic micronation are constantly getting excited about the fact that poor villagers have to tie their sheaves by hand in their fields. Well, agricultural machinery continues to be under the control of the old structures—officials of cooperative

agriculture, who do not have the slightest interest in truly helping the real owners of the land.

It needs to be added that the Lusatian Sorbs have experienced social upheavals with which they connected certain of their hopes three times during this century: It was after 1918, after 1945, and now. In the first two cases, they turned toward Czechoslovakia, even at the risk of being persecuted. However, no one has thus far examined their one-time attitudes from the economic standpoint. In both of the previously mentioned periods (after 1918 and after 1945), Czechoslovakia represented a significant economic force and in addition to offering a modicum of Slavic mutuality to Lusatian Sorb students, for example, was able to offer them even hard currency, the convertible Czechoslovak koruna, in the form of stipends. Now, the situation is exactly reversed. This is also why various Lusatian Sorb excursions are aimed more frequently toward the Federal Republic of Germany and to other capitalist neighbors and fewer groups are coming to visit us in Czechoslovakia (with the exception of 300 Lusatians who came to Prague on the occasion of the visit of the pope).

However, the Federal Republic of Germany sees the economic consequences of a united Germany differently through its eyes. West German politicians and national economists are well aware that they will have to pay a heavy price for German unity by fulfilling the economic conditions involved. The country with the best balance of payments in Europe is facing great expenditures, some of which are already under way. The fact that the Soviet Union agreed to German unification is compelling a united Germany, by way of a counterservice, to save the impotent Soviet planned so-called socialist economy. However, this expenditure is not the only one facing West German financiers and taxpayers. Clearly, remaining in the North Atlantic Alliance will cause a whole series of other expenditures for a unified Germany, expenditures of a military, political, and social character. However, the hardest nut for the Federal Republic of Germany to crack will be to raise the eastern (formerly communist) portion of Germany to its feet without more serious social collisions. From the economic standpoint, the status of this region is catastrophic and will require a complicated multiyear policy of economic renewal. And now, to top it all, the West German public has found that in that unhappy former GDR there is a small Slavic nation, the Lusatian Sorbs, which is making political demands in the form of asking for financial support for its national existence. Therefore, the public is accepting these facts with obvious discomfort: Should the still more or less unknown Lusatian Sorbs be again only paid?!

Although a united Germany is already gradually coming to terms with even this other problem, in this regard it would be appropriate for our Czechoslovak Government to assist Germany precisely with respect to the affairs of the Lusatian Sorbs. For us, it looks as though we could do a lot for the Lusatian Sorbs from the organizational, methodological, technical, and pedagogical viewpoint

which appears to be beyond the abilities of the united Germany: After all, Czechoslovakia is primarily a common state for two Slavic nations which are closest to the Lusatian Sorbs. Consequently, it is possible to offer the Lusatian Sorbs much within the framework of Czechoslovak-German cultural collaboration: For example, at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University in Prague the Department of Lusatian Sorb Language and Literature could be reopened, and we could offer numerous stipends to Lusatian Sorb students. Lusatian Sorb middle school students could be given the opportunity of studying in this country at general and specialized schools. We could place a certain capacity within our printing plants which have Slavic type (!) at the disposal of Lusatian Sorb publishers and the press. Also, our domestic churches, primarily the Catholic and Protestant, would get the opportunity of still further developing spiritual and religious cooperation. Moreover, they could learn a thing or two from the Lusatian Sorbs. For example, the outstanding Lusatian Sorb biweekly *KATOLICKY POSEL* has no equivalent in our country (unfortunately). Czechoslovakia would also be able to offer Lusatia as well as Germany a number of experts from the discipline of scientific Slavistics. This collaboration, conducted in a well-thought-out manner and systematically, would be a dignified contribution on the part of Czechoslovakia to all-European unity. It would stand counter to the concept of Germany as a one-sidedly national state.

From the conclusion of the preceding considerations, it is possible to make the transition from the problems of the Lusatian Sorbs in today's Germany from the economic standpoint to the generally political problem. Last winter and at the beginning of the year, there were still some opinions which indicated that the Germans were now open to the Lusatian Sorb question perhaps as never before. However, two aspects prevent the development of this perception regarding the relationship between German society and the Lusatian Sorb minority: On the one hand, it is the approach in accordance with which non-German areas are ceasing to be heard. The joy over the final achievement of German unity is running counter to all-European integration tendencies and is manifesting itself in efforts to expand the German national state (for the time being) through the path of increased economic influence, primarily in Eastern Europe. The second aspect of this problem are the former Lusatian Sorb Communists, who are now members of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), who, for the most part, control the majority of the Lusatian Sorb national institutions—while they are shortsightedly not aware of the fact that they can never be partners in a government headed by the CDU. And new people with clean hands do not want to allow the former "reds" to touch anything, at any price; they are more likely to be willing to pay for this attitude even at the price of total national discreditation. On the other hand, the Lusatian Sorb members of the CDU, who have already gradually

begun to gain ground in the process of unifying Germany, have done well in this situation and are continuing to do well. And it would be good if they were given the opportunity to cooperate even with related political directions in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and in other nations. This is another area in which aid for democratically oriented Lusatian Sorbs is welcome. However, cooperation on our part with Germany (be it political or cultural in nature to benefit the Lusatian Sorbs) must be tied to one condition: to the elimination of all Nazi tendencies in the present united Germany, be they ever so slight. But one can well imagine how the democratic all-German government will be struggling with this problem in the long-term future—a problem which the Federal Republic of Germany has always solved successfully.

Radical rightist tendencies, which would mean an attack by groups or even small groupings of German citizens against the Lusatian Sorb language, education system, against cultural and other national institutions, would most certainly result in the disintegration of the still existing Lusatian Sorb settlement in the Slavic portion of Lusatia. Then, only the most consciousness-aware component of the national intelligentsia would live in the Diaspora. That is why support for the Lusatian Sorbs on the part of Czechoslovakia also represents support for German democracy.

#### German Culture Institute Opens in Prague

91CH0123A Munich *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*  
in German 4 Nov 90 p 14

[Article by Stephan Wehowsky: "Guests Bringing History—Goethe Institute Opening in Prague"]

[Text] The small shops with their signs reminiscent of typography in the fifties and the restaurants reflecting the charm of a bygone era lend an air of innocence to Prague. Commercialism has not yet turned every square meter of space into a hotly contested display area for competing consumer goods. Restaurants and shops still appear to be biding their time until Prague's inner city is no longer affordable for its longtime denizens. The last, probably irreversible, occupation of Prague by speculators and tourists is yet to come.

It is not cynical to say that the first members of the Goethe Institute staff arrived in Prague prior to McDonald's opening its first fast food restaurant here. From a more sober point of view it should be noted that two manifestations of Western culture are approaching the city which once was one of its centers. The members of the Goethe Institute staff have yet another dichotomy to contend with. Their future home on the Gottwald-Quay not only has one of the most beautiful views of the Moldau and the Prague Castle, but also housed the embassy of the former GDR until last October.

### New Shadows

That weighs on one's mind even though this pressure is now being eclipsed by the awakening and the great expectations of the Prague public. The director of this first Goethe Institute in the CSFR, Jochen Bloss, a native of Dresden, who studied Slavic history in Vienna and Munich, is well aware of the difference between this and his previous assignments in Latin America. In those countries, he says, the Germans had no particular history to deal with; they were simply welcome guests whose presentations were gladly accepted. In Prague, there is an openness toward the new and there are great expectations regarding cultural life which was artificially concealed behind a curtain for 40 years—but at the same time the public is aware of the dark side of things. One of these shadows has to do with the most recent past. In conversation, Frantisek Cerni, the future CSFR cultural attache in Berlin, makes a passing reference to the fact that the unification of Germany resulted in the CSFR's loss of the GDR market which makes the already difficult economic situation appear even more hopeless.

Frantisek Cerni is typical of what the Goethe Institute staff may hope for. It is not just Cerni's indestructible friendliness and his composure born of insight. It is also fascinating to see how profoundly untouched Cerni is by Western consumerism. He is still consumed with an interest in cultural life which almost appears to be a utopian counterposition to media-inspired forms of narcissism. Listening to him speak conjures up images of books piled high in a small room and friends coming by to engage in lively discussions.

### Plus and Minus

Jochen Bloss says that cultural life in Prague today is comparable to the situation in postwar Germany. He does not feel, however, that his offerings should solely consist of items that seem particularly suitable from the Western point of view. "We have no need for a uniform European culture," he says. "What we want instead is to present a free exchange of the pluses and minuses of traditional values, national characteristics, or social phenomena." The downfall of the communist dictatorships did not mean that culture had to start over at square one. Some things flourished quite well below the surface, providing the intellectual substance to the "peaceful revolution" applauded in the West.

But what good is intellectual substance in the face of a desperate economic situation which the "revolutionaries" do not know how to resolve? In fact, they never did know how to go about it, as Timothy Garden Ash points out in his analyses, reports, and observations, under the title *A Century Is Voted Out of Office*.

Cerni says that the situation is more difficult than was ever assumed because the Gulf crisis and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have virtually closed the door on all the options. Western capitalism comes marching in and subjects one and all to grotesque differences in monetary value. The two new cleaning women hired by

the Goethe Institute, for example, are paid 4,500 korunas which is more than a doctor or university professor earns—and yet 4,000 korunas are worth a mere 200 German marks [DM]. It does not take a lot of imagination to figure out that the egalitarian society will be blasted apart in the immediate future and human solidarity will seem naive and antiquated.

### Some Ideals Still Retain Their Validity

Cerni says that Vaclav Havel calmed some Plzen workers down a few days ago who were furious about the economic situation. Kurt Krolop, a professor teaching in Prague who was active back in 1968 and had to go underground in the GDR for a time as a consequence, asked Havel ironically how he managed to calm the workers down. "He told them that things would get far worse and that this was the price they had to pay for the freedom they had sought for such a long time."

There we have it again: That deeply rooted intellectuality which has not yet been contaminated by cynicism. Those in this country who believe in ideals are not romantics by any means. Odo Marquard, the philosopher, says that culture is compensatory in the sense that its purpose is to relieve human beings of the constraints of everyday life. Surely that is an argument which cannot yet be accepted by people in the CSFR. It is a moot point whether acceptance of the argument at some future date would be a sign of progress.

The "expanded notion of culture" which the Goethe Institute has been promoting since the seventies may serve to do justice to the former, more fundamental notion of culture in Prague. The concept is "expanded" to the extent that cultural life is part of dealing with everyday life, i.e., is not restricted to gallery openings and chamber music evenings. Confrontation with everyday life includes the motion pictures of Achternbusch, Fassbinder, Herzog, and Trotta, retrospectives of which are to be shown in Prague. Bloss stresses that he intends to present "multimedia programs dealing with specific themes rather than individual lectures, simple theater evenings or traditional movie nights." A library containing at least 10,000 books and a well-assorted magazine reading room are to present a diversified image of present-day Germany.

The rooms of the former GDR embassy in Prague are better suited for this purpose than some others in Prague. This is why the Goethe Institute staff has learned to live with the unfortunate past which includes absurd looking steel cabinets and typical GDR furniture.

One of the principal objectives of the Goethe Institute is to spread the German language. Surprisingly, there are a great many people in Czechoslovakia who do speak German, up to 50 percent in some areas—and the demand continues to be strong. Some teachers who have applied for a scholarship in Germany cannot be accepted because their knowledge of German far exceeds the requirements for admission to the German courses being offered. Others, Russian teachers, for example, who are scarcely in demand these days and are

looking for new jobs, have to start from scratch. There is talk of "requalification"; the Goethe Institute is to help design the programs of instruction. In addition, Edeltraud Keilholz-Ruehle, the director of the language teaching section in Prague, intends to offer courses for some 1,000 students.

Of all high school and university students, on a national average, 45 percent opt for German and 45 percent for English language instruction. The remaining 10 percent are divided up between Russian, French and Spanish. No one really knows why German is so important. Leonie Tesarova, who teaches German at the Prague Academy for Economics, cites practical reasons. Germany is close by, she says; so there is a desire to be able to communicate. For his part, Pavel Cink, the head of the Foreign Language Department in the Ministry for Education, Youth and Physical Education of the Czech Republic, believes that above and beyond cultural ties the primary reason is economics. The objective is to be able to take good care of tourists and to communicate with German business firms. But the matter will be examined more closely in the near future, Cink says.

But those who study German are not the only ones motivated by economics. At present, school book publishers are also entering the marketplace. On the one hand, there they are encountering a vacuum, but, on the other hand, people in Prague have also found clever ways of helping themselves. *German With Laughter* is the title of a textbook developed by the teaching staff of the Academy for Economics over the past few years and sold for a few korunas to the students.

There is a sad side to the study of German, too. One does not merely have to think back to the days when GDR lecturers taught the language. The GDR cultural institute on Narodni Street which leads from St. Wenceslas Square down to the Moldau and which is where the students were beaten up by the police last November was boycotted by the public for years following the events of 1968, despite the fact that the institute tempted the public with cheap books and records, which now are no longer available.

These changing times are often characterized by dark or, better still, oppressive signs. The cultivation of the German language may also be tied to designs pursued by the erstwhile German minority which are no less narrow-minded than the ethnic conflicts between Slovaks and Czechs or the Hungarian minority. Jochen Bross and Edeltraud Keilholz-Ruehle will have to display a high level of sensitivity and firmness on this score. They will have to find ways of doing justice to the interest in the German language while avoiding all forms of German cultural arrogance. The preconditions are good to the extent that Pavel Cink has fulfilled a wish of his own at the start of the new school year, i.e., the first group of dual-language secondary schools has been set up. Since these schools for English, French, and German students were designed by the Czechoslovak education ministry, overly nationalistic tendencies have probably been neutralized in advance.

## HUNGARY

### Report on Iraqi Tanker: Havana Revokes Accreditation of Journalist

91CH0175A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
21 Nov 90 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "Havana Withdraws Our Reporter's Operating License"]

[Excerpt] For the first time in the history of the NEPSZABADSAG we are obliged to report that a permanent foreign correspondent of this newspaper has had his operating license revoked by the government of a host country. Our Havana reporter, Csaba Nagy, was the passive subject of the case which was also reported by large international news agencies. He has worked in the Cuban capital for nearly four and a half years and is recognized for observing high journalistic standards in his reports on Cuba and on Latin America as a whole.

The Cubans revoked Nagy's accreditation based on a report entitled, "Iraqi Tanker at the Havana Harbor," published in the 13 November issue of the NEPSZABADSAG. The Cubans indicated that the withdrawal of Nagy's accreditation was not equivocal to an expulsion by a certain date, and that it did not require the newspaper to shut down its office in Havana. The editor in chief of the NEPSZABADSAG rejected the charges and registered his protest against the Cuban decision.

In the spirit of objective reporting, we will reprint our reporter's 13 November article, followed by the full text of yesterday morning's report published in the GRANMA.

This is what the NEPSZABADSAG reporter had to say:

"Over the weekend, our reporter watched as the harbor pilot towed an Iraqi oil tanker to the entrance of the harbor. Despite the stormy weather and the waves, one could see well the identifying mark painted on the side of the ship, and that the water level indicator was rather high. Accordingly, one may assume that the vessel was (still? already?) empty.

"Although Havana is not willing to comment officially on the presence of the Iraqi tanker in the Cuban harbor, diplomatic sources informed our reporter that allegedly, the island country continues to purchase and receive oil from Baghdad at the discount price offered by Iraq. For the time being, no specific facts support the information received by foreign diplomats.

"At the same time, in its Monday issue the Cuban Communist Party's Central committee newspaper, the GRANMA, indicated that between 7 and 10 November Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Jose Ramon Fernandez

paid an official visit to Iraq. Negotiations took place with Head of State Saddam Hussein, and Fernandez conveyed a personal message from Fidel Castro."

GRANMA's Tuesday report says the following:

"On 13 November the Hungarian daily newspaper, the NEPSZABADSAG, published a report by its Havana reporter Csaba Nagy, according to which the journalist personally observed an Iraqi oil tanker leaving Havana harbor after it unloaded its cargo.

"These allegations lack all foundations for truth. They are the reporter's brainchild, and only he could tell what his intentions were when he filed the report.

"In any event, the lies immediately prompted comments from the anti-Cuban radio stations maintained by the United States Government, and provided an opportunity to damage Cuba's prestige and dignity. The island country's position and conduct regarding the observance of Security Council Resolution 661 has always been, and always will be exemplary.

"As a result Cuban authorities have sufficient grounds to assume that journalist Csaba Nagy intentionally told a lie. This exhausts the criteria established for the concept of violating professional ethics. Such violations are not compatible with the accreditation of the reporter by Cuba. Therefore, as of today, his accreditation as a journalist should be regarded as revoked."

There are two comments regarding this matter. First: Before filing his report, the NEPSZABADSAG reporter requested an official Cuban opinion concerning the Iraqi oil tanker. He did not receive a response, even though such comment would have been desirable, because, as Reuter remarked relative to this case, "Cuba condemned Iraq's invasion and incorporation of Kuwait. At the same time however, contrary to the majority in the U.N. Security Council, Cuba was opposed to the economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad, and the observance of those sanctions by the United States and its allies." (Cuba abstained from voting in the Security Council). Second: The Cuban charge against our reporter was based on a statement that cannot be found in the reporter's writing.

Insofar as details are concerned, Csaba Nagy informed the editorial office that on Monday foreign ministry officials acknowledged the fact that there were indeed two Iraqi oil tankers in the vicinity of Cuba. It was reported that "these got stuck here as a result of the embargo." The decision reached by Cuba, and the tone of the accusation is incomprehensible to us because in the course of almost four and a half years the Cubans never disapproved of the reporter's work. By the same token, taking into consideration the possibility of differences in opinion, they recognized the high standard, and objective journalistic activities of the reporter.

We learned that the Cubans officially informed Hungarian Ambassador Bela Bardocz of their decision. The

ambassador expressed his regrets concerning the decision, but he also questioned the foreign ministry as to why this sanction affects only the NEPSZABADSAG reporter although local reporters of the AFP [Agence France Presse] and IPS [Inter/Press Service] news agencies reported the same event, based on what they saw with their own eyes, independent from the Hungarian reporter. The ambassador did not receive a satisfactory response. Our reporter told us that his foreign colleagues, accredited in Havana, assured him of their support, and that several reporters also confirmed having seen that same Iraqi oil tanker

The official position taken by the NEPSZABADSAG is contained in a statement submitted by Editor in Chief Pal Eotvos to the MTI [The Hungarian Telegraph Agency]:

"We do not understand, and are stunned by the decision made by the Cuban authorities to revoke Csaba Nagy's accreditation. Over a four and a half year period the Havana reporter of the NEPSZABADSAG performed his work in an objective manner, while observing high professional standards. At this time, in filing a report on what he himself witnessed, he once again performed his duties as a journalist. This report evoked disapproval from Cuban authorities. Last week, prior to the publication of the news, our reporter requested in vain for two days an official Cuban comment on what he had witnessed. At this point, however, the facts ascertained by the reporter were dismissed as a lie, and officials at the Foreign Ministry talked about political tendencies and slander. At the same time, they also acknowledged the fact that there were two Iraqi oil tankers in the vicinity of Cuba. These ships allegedly "got stuck there as a result of the embargo." The editorial offices of the NEPSZABADSAG registered its protest with official Cuban authorities for revoking its reporter's accreditation."

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In response to our request, Foreign Ministry spokesman Janos Herman said that, in the opinion of the ministry, the decision made by Cuba constitutes an unfriendly step and will not improve the international view regarding Cuba. [passage omitted]

#### MDF Ex-Chairman on Need for 'National Center'; Aligns With Pozsgay

91CH0173A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET  
in Hungarian 21 Oct 90 p 5

[Interview with former Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) chairman Zoltan Biro by Eva Onody; place and date not given: "A New Party Structure Is Evolving in Hungary—Biro on the Compromises Made, the Chances of the MDF, and the National Center"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] Political analysts are not the only ones kept busy when noted politicians and people active in public life abandon their offices and turn against everything they

formerly stood for, or temporarily try to sail on calmer waters. The motivating factors behind such decisions are as much of interest as the conclusions one draws. As reported earlier, Zoltan Biro surrendered his post as chairman of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. Last week he severed his relations with the party itself. He was one of the catalysts behind the Lakitelek movement. This is what he had to say about the antecedents of his present action.

#### Save What Can Be Saved

[Biro] The first Lakitelek meeting took place in 1987. It was preceded by a month of preparations. A few of us sat down at the Europe Espresso terrace in August. That's where we decided that something had to be done in order to prevent the catastrophe toward which this country was progressing. We established the need to convene a broadly based meeting. This of course was on the heels of the end of a twenty year struggle? Although everyone experienced these twenty years in different ways, the essence of the experience of these years was the same. We tried to give birth to a new kind of Hungary within or outside of the party.

[Onody] Most of your friends were outside the party at the time. As far as I know, you were the only Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] member among the organizers of Lakitelek. This fact itself begs the question of how did you relate to these people one or two decades ago from within the MSZMP?

[Biro] Unlike Sandor Csoori, Lajos Fur, Csaba Kiss, or Sandor Lezsak—my friends outside the party—I never had the feeling that I was serving someone else. This was a very simple matter. There was only one party, and a person joined that party for one of three reasons. First: The smallest group sincerely professed Marxist beliefs; Second: There were careerists who knew that they could not succeed without the MSZMP; and Third: There was a stratum—a rather large stratum, in my view—in the middle 1960's that felt that Hungarian public life could not be improved by ways other than the party providing leadership to political life. As it turned out, even amid the grave restrictions, there were opportunities to try to represent a different will, a different atmosphere, and a different politician intent. This was subsequently proved to be true. These forces played a rather significant role in preventing the party from ending up where the parties of let's say the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia did. All of this is also to the credit of those outside the party and of course, to international events.

[Onody] Were you forced to make serious compromises within the MSZMP?

[Biro] Frequently, but I was never forced to make compromises that raised grave issues of conscience. I was not part of the party apparatus. A simple party membership provided an opportunity to candidly and firmly express my opinion. My sphere of movement expanded when I became a division head in Imre Pozsgay's Ministry.

[Onody] Rumors at the time said that as head of the division concerned with literature and the press you were able to prevent a number of damaging measures.

[Biro] Gyorgy Aczel exercised extremely strong control over this area. Thus I was unable to perform much constructive work, but I was able to prevent the destruction of institutions and persons. I am able to say this without boasting. These measures may not have been prevented had my position been occupied by some other person of a different outlook, with different inclinations, or if a person other than Pozsgay had been the minister.

[Onody] For instance...

[Biro] For example: They were unable to ban a single newspaper published in the countryside, and they were unable to remove a single editor in chief of those newspapers. The TISZATAJ, the FORRAS, and the ALFOLD, which are published in Debrecen, and the JELENKOR of Pecs, were constantly on the political agenda of those days as candidates for removing an editor in chief, a writer, or banning these newspapers altogether.

[Onody] Is your removal from the ministry related to this matter?

[Biro] The main reason they gave, was my lack of preparedness, my unwillingness to cooperate, and the claim that I hindered the disciplining of these newspapers.

[Onody] Accordingly, in 1987, those gathered in Lakitelek were among the first to start something entirely new within a legitimate framework, and appealing to broader social strata, in a larger community. What was the essence of this spirit?

[Biro] The nation and democracy served as the basic thoughts. These two things were to be linked in this country the way we saw it at the time because democracy makes no sense, it cannot function, and accordingly, it loses its purpose, unless it represents the national interest. On the other hand, the country is unable to recover from its troubles in the absence of democratic conditions. It would be impossible to establish humane living conditions. Linking the nation concept with democracy has been a long standing endeavor of mine.

#### Grosz Was Concerned About the Public Mood

[Onody] How did Pozsgay come to Lakitelek?

[Biro] I am glad you asked that question, because the press misinterpreted this situation. Lacking an opportunity, we were unable to discuss this matter. I worked with Pozsgay during his tenure as minister, but Pozsgay has been a good friend of Sandor Csoori for quite some time. As soon as the idea of Lakitelek emerged we felt that Pozsgay's place was among us. This is true, except for the fact that at that time, Pozsgay served as executive

secretary of the Patriotic People's Front as a member of the Central Committee and was a leading personality within the party.

[Onody] A rather sensitive situation evolved as a result.

[Biro] The situation was sensitive from our point of view because we did not want to cause his failure. We took into consideration the fact that Pozsgay would risk his political future if he took part in the Lakitelek meeting. We agreed to pay a visit to Pozsgay. He immediately responded in the affirmative. Thus, by risking his own future, he provided a certain degree of support to the meeting. Those 160 persons meeting under the Lakitelek tent felt that there was a person among them whose presence could provide a certain degree of protection.

[Onody] Pozsgay was the one to publicize the Lakitelek meeting in an interview granted to the MAGYAR NEMZET.

[Biro] This was his second very important action. We planned to issue brief statements to the Hungarian press, but we knew that this would not be an easy task. Karoly Grosz also received these statement, but in his response he expressed a feeling that we had an overly somber view of the present and that this would do harm the public mood. Pozsgay made the text of the Lakitelek statement part of his interview. He was held accountable for doing so, and at that time, he came the closest to becoming the subject of party disciplinary action. By then the party leadership became uncertain. It frequently acted in a imprudent manner from its own standpoint, and took hasty steps. Our expulsion from the party for instance, was one such step. (At issue is the expulsion of Zoltan Biro, Zoltan Kiraly, Laszlo Lengyel, and Mihaly Bihari—the editor).

[Onody] The spirit of Lakitelek has been violated with the passage of time. The public was also informed of the fact that you dropped the MDF. Very little is known, however, of the reason why you previously removed yourself from the MDF presidium.

[Biro] During the fall of 1989, I decided to resign my position as managing chairman. The main reason for this was that by then, a few organizations—primarily the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]—endeavored to accuse the MDF of collaborating with former party members, moreover with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and mainly with Pozsgay. My MSZMP past would by all means have meant a liability for the MDF preparing itself for parliamentary elections. I did not want to diminish the MDF's chances. (People were beginning to talk about a Pozsgay-Biro pact already). The other reason was that the MDF was drifting slowly, and in a defensive manner. It was satisfied with mere reactions to these charges. Subsequently, the breach was prompted by the nomination of the president of the republic. I did not agree with that. My feelings were that it did not make sense for the MDF to enter into this struggle. We would only splinter our strength, and no one would come gain from this struggle. A very tough battle—nevertheless devoid of anger—took place in the

MDF presidium, and I was left in the minority. In the final analysis, any democracy is based on majority decisions. This meant that I could not remain managing chairman of an organization in which I represented the minority regarding such an important issue.

[Onody] Are you used to making decisions on such rational basis?

[Biro] I endeavor to do so because decisions must be made only on a rational basis. This, however, does not mean that such decisions do not have emotional aspects. Nevertheless, I do not have a bad conscience. At the same time, I would not say that I did not have ill feelings after making this decision. I have very many friends within the MDF. Only after a great inner struggle did I reach the end result of the point where I left the presidium, and at present the MDF itself.

[Onody] So you left the MDF. Don't you think that this will hasten the fall of your party?

[Biro] My leaving the MDF does not mean that hereafter I do not regard the MDF as an important organization. It does not mean that I cease to have friendly feelings toward all those people in the MDF, or that I disapprove of the existence of such a party in Hungarian public life. On the other hand, this is not the kind of party that I wanted to start in those days! I do not believe that the MDF will fall apart at its fourth national meeting, and I hope that it will not fall apart. The fact that there is serious dissatisfaction, and that such dissatisfaction will be voiced is yet another matter. Insofar as the political formula which divides the country along the lines of a right wing and left wing parties is concerned, I included a statement in my farewell letter to express that I found such division to be premature. In general, real Hungarian progression did not occur along the lines of the right wing or the left wing. Real progression is made along some kind of a third alternative that evolves psychologically and intellectually, as well as politically. This third alternative may perhaps be characterized in the names of Kolcsey, Ferenc Deak, or Endre Ady. In subsequent times, it may be designated by certain movements, and even later by Istvan Bibó and Gyula Illyés. They were not similar in every respect, neither in terms of taste, nor in ideology and political conduct. But all of these persons and movements were linked by common political and ethical values. As a whole, they cannot be regarded as either right wing or left wing.

#### We Are Thinking Along the Lines Established by Pozsgay

[Onody] Does all this provide the outlines of a future party or political movement?

[Biro] I feel that out of necessity a new party structure will evolve in Hungary. This country does not have a Center Party to represent a certain degree of national unity and common foundations. A number of signs indicate that the MDF has definitely shifted to the right. At the same time

there does not exist a left of center group with which it could jointly represent the National Center.

[Onody] What does the term "National Center" mean?

[Biro] A strong centrist party, or a balance between the right of center and the left of center, in which a strong party represents this idea in some form, could represent the idea of a "National Center." It would have been much more appropriate for the MDF to take advantage of this opportunity and to maintain its character as the National Center. This is so because within certain limits it would have been able to integrate rightwing and leftwing values.

[Onody] Why do you regard this so-called National Center as so important?

[Biro] I am convinced that there will be a need for a consciousness of national belonging, for the moral foundations of this consciousness not only in Hungary, but as long as nations exist at all. I do not see a movement in which nations become dissolved in some kind of great universality. On the other hand, I recognize that Europe is in the process of organizing itself, already rather strongly at this point, in the framework of nations. European integration will not occur by virtue of supranational forces, but as a result of actions taken by nations. If these nations are healthy, the end result will be a healthy Europe. An unhealthy Europe will result if these nations are sick.

[Onody] What you just said is not only similar to, but identical with Pozsgay's ideals. He expressed the same thought the other day in the radio program "First Hand." Incidentally, in that program the two of you were placed rather close to each other.

[Biro] This is natural. They appropriately recognize that our thoughts are essentially similar to those of Pozsgay, in regard to issues pertaining to the nation or to democracy, or concerning the Hungarian political situation.

### Trial of Key Figure of Duna-Gate Scandal Continues

#### Defense Motions, Bias Claimed

91CH0178A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
21 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by Akos Toth: "Complaints Filed Against Everyone!"]

[Text] Many events in yesterday's trial of Jozsef Vegvari by the Budapest Military Tribunal could fit into an operetta. Vegvari was the catalyst of the infamous Duna-Gate case. The court did not learn anything even after hearing the witnesses, and a complaint was filed against the court itself. If the case continues this way, Duna-Gate, which started as a political drama last January, may sooner or later turn into a legal comedy.

At the opening of the trial Vegvari's defense attorney Miklos Roth announced that he filed a "motion of prejudice" with the Office of the Supreme Prosecutor against the designated military court and against presiding military judge Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hildebrand. The motion complains that the court "disregards remarks made by the defense attorney, all it does is to reprimand the defense attorney." Roth also told the court that he filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court. This complaint challenges the constitutionality of punishment to which Vegvari may be sentenced based on the gravest charge filed against him. That charge is the "violation of duties while on duty." It carries a one to five year prison sentence.

In response to a defense motion the presiding judge detailed the approximately 50-page long record of the proceedings thus far. This was unusual. Only after reading the record did it become apparent why Dr. Roth insisted on the detailed reading of the record: He felt that he discovered substantive differences between the court record on the one hand, and the statements which may be heard on the video recording of the trial prepared by associates of Black Box. Roth proposed that the court change the record based on the recording.

Thereafter the court heard the testimony of witnesses. Police Junior Sergeant Istvan Biro was first to enter the room. On that certain afternoon of 25 December Biro stood guard at the gate between 1200 and 1600 hours. He recalled the events: Vegvari came to see him after the changing of guards and told him that two of his relatives were to pay a visit. The two guests arrived at 1400 hours; they looked like "slightly intoxicated relatives from the countryside." The two men carried three bags and a bottle, but Biro was not authorized to check the contents of the bags. Responding to a question raised by the court as to whether Division III/III command chief Jozsef Horvath appeared during Biro's hours of duty, Biro said that he did not see Horvath.

Former police lieutenant Sandor Bogdany was next to testify. He was on duty with Vegvari on 25 December last. Asked if the defendant made a telephone call during the morning hours, Bogdany replied in the affirmative, but could not tell with whom Vegvari talked. At this point the third witness, retired Major General Jozsef Horvath, head of the Division III/III command was called to testify. He told the court that on 25 December he did indeed talk to Vegvari over the phone. Vegvari called him because he felt that conceivably the [Romanian] Securitate would try to penetrate the building, and that therefore Vegvari doubled the number of government guards on duty. Horvath agreed with this action, nevertheless he got dressed and went to the building to look around. He was surprised to see that only one government guard was at his post. He conversed with that guard.

Once confronted with the government guard who was also summoned to appear, the guard maintained that part of his previous testimony which holds that the former major general did not enter the building. Horvath responded by saying that "I was there probably before noon, I did not observe the time, this is how insignificant I felt this matter was."

Responding to the prosecutor's questions Horvath further testified that the Division III/III command continued to perform state security work even after 23 October 1989. They held Roland Antoniewicz under surveillance, and organized personal protection for Tamas Deutsch and Gaspar Miklos Tamas who were threatened by the Securitate. The two refused such protection. Division III/III was also watching national socialist organizing efforts which flourish in Hungary. Without exception, the results of these actions are contained in daily reports.

Thereafter the court questioned three witnesses concerning the date when members of Division III/III took their oath to the constitution of the republic. The three uniformly stated that they signed the text of the oath on 19 December. One of the witnesses added that he signed it with Vegvari. In contrast, Vegvari's previous testimony states that he signed the oath "sometime between Christmas and New Year."

Medical experts will testify as the trial continues today.

#### Medical Experts Testify

91CH0178B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
22 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Akos Toth: "Six Pints of Red Wine and Coke! Vegvari Is Not Mentally Ill. He Suffers From Personal Identity Disturbances"]

[Text] Is Vegvari mentally ill? Expressed or unexpressed, this was the main issue at the trial before the Budapest Military Tribunal on Wednesday.

Chief physician Dr. Andras Reti was first to be called to the hearing room. He treated Vegvari at the Sopron sanatorium from 13 September, and told the court that Vegvari was referred to the sanatorium with locomotor disorder disease and with "symptoms of depression." Consistent with these findings he received physical therapy and various antidepressants and drugs to relieve anxiety. After three weeks of treatment Vegvari left the sanatorium rested, in a good mood.

General medical expert Dr. Miklos Molnar regarded Vegvari's physical condition as satisfactory. Asked whether Vegvari's disappearance on 18 October was acceptable from a medical standpoint Molnar said that "Vegvari recounted the events by saying that upon returning home from the trial he ate dinner, took four tranquilizers and drank a great deal of red wine mixed with cola. Based on his frame of mind and the joint effect of what he consumed one could believe that the story he told may have actually taken place."

Medical doctor Lt. Col. Ervin Nagy reported the results of neurological and psychological examinations conducted at the Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense. "Vegvari is not mentally ill, he is not intellectually deteriorated, but the fact is that he is struggling with a personal identity disturbance," Nagy said. Responding to the court's inquiry to define the meaning of the term "personal identity disturbance," the expert said that the defendant "tried to think in terms of a great historical context in a period when there was nothing to hold on to." This was coupled with the fact that Vegvari's personality was fundamentally extremist, meaning that he experienced periods when he was relaxed, followed virtually without a transition by melancholy and depression. In judging Vegvari's action, consideration should be given to the fact that he consumed alcohol on 25 December, and therefore his self-control was not perfect.

Thereafter the prosecutor asked Vegvari whether he was "under the influence of alcohol" on 25 December, the day he committed the act. Vegvari invoked his legal rights and refused to answer.

An expert psychologist's testimony revealed that Vegvari may be deemed to have a "good, average level" intellect, based on tests performed with his consent. The psychologist confirmed the psychiatrist's professional opinion, adding that Vegvari most likely overestimated the importance of his personality in the musical field, because he was not competent in the field of music. The expert believes that the defendant felt that he was also in the limelight among the artists. Presumably this feeling highly inflated his ego, and this is why he attributed much more significance to his modest performance than it really had. This phenomenon also appeared in his book.

After hearing from the medical experts the court ordered the trial to be continued on 29 November. At that time experts on secrets will testify, and the court's judgment is expected to be pronounced.

#### Habsburg Supranational Tradition Viewed as Relevant

91CH0173B Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET  
in Hungarian 12 Nov 90 p 7

[Excerpts from the opening statement at the first international colloquium of the Europe Institute Budapest by former Nemeth regime Minister of Culture and Education Ferenc Glatz: "The Habsburg Question: Yesterday and Today"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] The Europe Institute Budapest held its first international colloquium recently. Leading Austrian, German, Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian experts on the Habsburg question participated. This writing is an abbreviated version of the opening statement.

Otto Habsburg, son of Karoly IV, the last crowned Hungarian king, appeared on Hungarian television for the first time a few years ago. In fluent Hungarian, he discussed Hungary's opportunities in the European integration, the pan-European movement, and his own life. In a peculiar fashion, his statements evoked generally favorable reactions among members of the younger generations, though not necessarily among Catholics, Christians, or older persons who believed in the idea of legitimate succession. Youth and the simple people responded favorably, those who were somewhat bored with the ideological patterns reflected in formal education and in history books since 1945—statements about feudalism, capitalism and socialism—became bored with our intellectual discourse concerning the evolution of forms of government, kingdoms, republics, etc. Just as one of my students, a historian, noted: England and Holland were kingdoms, nevertheless they found everyday British society to be far more democratic than Central European society. Conceivably, incidents like these may reveal the saddening phenomenon of lack of political education, but it is equally possible that broad strata of society are unable to deal with our intellectual discourse. These facts may also demonstrate that for a long time, a large part of Hungarian society has had neither positive nor negative emotions concerning Habsburg rule, and the possible restoration of the kingdom. We are aware of the fact that in the minds of a few, the Habsburg question acquires certain political overtones. These represent nostalgic feelings toward the ideal of the old Hungarian kingdom. They manifest an attraction of intellectual and religious circles which labor on reviving Christian policies, and an enthusiasm manifested by intellectuals for a thus far prohibited subject matter. In the eyes of the broad masses today, Otto Habsburg is a likeable politician who represents European standards.

I am aware, of course, that the situation is by far different in other former Habsburg countries. Permit me not to discuss the situation of Austria. As everyone knows, in that country the Habsburg question has some current political relevance among the broad masses ever since 1918. The history of the Habsburg question between 1918 and 1990 could be the topic of a monograph describing clashes between republicans and monarchists, the political aspects of Catholicism and the Habsburg tradition, the conflict between the concept of a German empire on the one hand, and the Austrian or Central European Habsburg tradition on the other, etc. I am not even going to discuss the fact that the Habsburg tradition may gain current political significance while we ponder the future role of Austria in these days of German reunification. One wonders whether German unity or active political cooperation with the small nations of Central Europe constitutes the realistic path for Austrians at present, toward the end of the 20th Century. Irrespective of whether political scientists or university students discuss the present, the extent to which answers to these questions may be regarded as "scientific" can be seen from a question raised by my student, which was: Why are the Austrians upset by the

fact that God assigned such a favorable place for them? They have a thousand year old leading culture, they are beholders of German culture, and meanwhile, they can make use of all this in the framework of their traditional relationships with other small nations and states in the Danube region.

Equally, I do not wish to discuss the ideological charge that the Habsburg question was received between the two wars in the minds of our Northern, Eastern and Southern neighbors. Only sociologists could find out whether hatred toward the Habsburg family still exists among the national intelligentsia of our neighbors, or if the Habsburg family is liked by Catholics at a time when the Soviet system is in the process of disintegration. This too could be the subject of a monograph. Insofar as Hungary, Austria, and our Northern, Eastern and Southern neighbors are concerned, I am certain only of one thing, and that is that threatening the people of this region with possible Hungarian territorial claims, or with the restoration of the Monarchy, would amount to a childish, but evil political game. Territorial revisions, royalist restoration, and Austrian-German colonizing or so-called Hungarianizing efforts, are unrealistic in this region, and serious people do not even have such matters in mind.

On the other hand, the Habsburg question also includes another tradition. This tradition is increasingly gaining strength in the minds of the people of this region. It is a yearning for institutions which stand above the nation states, and a disillusionment with the idea of small statehood. We have been saying this for years. Small statehood is one of the factors which causes misery in the societies of this region. This yearning expresses a need for political institutions which enable the free flow of the labor force, and the free movement of the populace (marriage, commerce, employment, education, artistic activities, etc.). As pointed out in a number of monographs and studies written by historians, Habsburg rule itself may be the subject of much substantial criticism in Austria and in Hungary, as well as in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania. Still, the Habsburg period may be viewed in an entirely different light in the course of historical presentations if we abstain from expressing preferences for political institutions and focus on society, and on man, who labored in the course of history. We must focus instead on man and his relationship with nature, on human relations, on his work performance, his holidays, his faith, his joy, and his sorrow. The period I am talking about are the centuries during which members of the Habsburg family were the heads of the various states. An historical outlook of this kind may result in the praising of the Habsburg rule for matters it is being condemned for today, such as, hindering the evolution of the so-called nation states, and for placing fewer obstacles in the path of the free

evolution of the individual than the obstacles that were established in the era of nation states. (True, when described in history books, this kind of outlook on history will deal more with the everyday life of bureaucrats, peasants, workers, or for that matter, with the "working" ruler, than with cabinet meetings and political skirmishes within the court.) Accordingly, the matter whose renaissance we are witnessing at the end of the 20th Century amounts to more than the revival of Habsburg tradition. It also constitutes a disillusionment with developments brought about by various kinds of nationalism, and a general disillusionment with the ideologies forced upon us by the middle classes of the nation states.

Accordingly, the Habsburg question no longer has a current political (perhaps conservative) connotation in this region, one that should prompt historians not to deal with this subject. To the contrary, the history of this region includes many highly positive current traditions which have their roots in the Habsburg era. One such tradition is the freedom of movement, a yard stick by which we measure ourselves, which is different by necessity. Exploration of this tradition may not only be an acceptable task for historians, legal scholars, and economists, this tradition should also be dealt with in these days, at a time when people of this region are trying to find new political and economic directions. Where do we go from here? This question presents itself once again as a result of German reunification on the one hand, and the contraction of the Soviet zone on the other. Social scientists should candidly reveal to present day society, the expectations that it may harbor, based on the absurd degree of small statehood conserved by the Stalinist system, and on political developments which discontinue small statehood. Social scientists must also reveal what the idea of caring for the nation could mean in terms of independent national development once we abandon the fiction of nation states. Or, for that matter, they should explain that it is possible for a nation to stay alive as a cohesive community without a state which acts as the organization of force. This could be expressed in terms of arguments against the evolution of a Habsburg state. One may perceive a free evolution of national communities without corresponding states, or without states based on national majorities.

Irrespective of the direction development takes during the 1990's in this region, we must rethink the several centuries old relationships that exist between the people of this region. Equally, we must rethink the institutional framework in which these people live. The institutional system provided by the Habsburg state did not prove to be appropriate in those days. Many of us believe that small statehood did not provide appropriate solutions either. Accordingly, the history and future of the former Habsburg countries must be viewed in a new light. This view must be devoid of nostalgia, of all kinds of notions about imperial superiority, and of all kinds of national inferiority complexes. Europe Institute Budapest intends

to foster intellectual thought based on European standards which are free from nationalistic ideas and concepts based on statehood. I feel that reconsideration of the Habsburg question—making this issue a research topic free of emotions—fits closely into this program.

#### Newly Appointed Radio President Recounts Communist Past

91CH0138A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 2 Nov 90 p 7

[Interview with Csaba Gombar, president of Hungarian Radio, by Anna Szekely; place and date not given: "The Stages of Nonpartisanship"]

[Text] Anyone who looks up Csaba Gombar in the Hungarian *Ki Kicsoda* [Who's Who] will immediately notice that the 54-year-old sociologist and political scientist has allowed only his most essential biographical information to be published. A few dates from his life history, his studies, places of employment, published works, and that is all. In the reference work there are numerous examples to illustrate that most artists, the public's darlings, are reluctant to dwell on their stormy marriages or to reveal that they already have a teenage son or daughter, for instance. But why has Csaba Gombar been so reticent? That is a puzzle.

"My daughter did object to her being omitted from my biography. I told her she would eventually make *Ki Kicsoda* on her own if she kept studying and working," smiled Csaba Gombar at the start of our interview. "One of my friends was toying with the idea of telling the canvassers that his hobby was writing obituaries. Do you think that I, too, should have come out with something similar?"

[Szekely] Not a bad idea. But you do not seem to be that playful. Sometimes overcautious. The day before your appointment as president of Hungarian Radio, I requested an interview with you. Naturally, its publication would have been held up until after your appointment was announced. You cancelled that interview at the very last moment. I thought it strange that a prominent public figure missed an opportunity to expound his views at all times and under any conditions. Or did you perhaps fear that the whole thing might fall through because you gave interviews?

[Gombar] How could an interview have jeopardized my nomination? I simply could not think of anything profound to say publicly. I was not running for this job. It came as a complete surprise. I have enough imagination to realize that, under the present economic conditions and amidst such great social and political uncertainty, it is rather dreadful to be the head of such a run-down, huge public institution. I liked my earlier contemplative life as a researcher in the social sciences. Whereas in this job I constantly find myself in stressful situations, have to assume responsibility for very many people and am often required to make important decisions.

[Szekely] I requested an interview with you at that time because I wanted to make the readers of MAGYAR HIRLAP better acquainted with you as a person. But you seem to object to allowing the public at large to gain a more intimate knowledge of public figures. I know, for instance, that you were angry at your friend, Mihaly Bihari, because he had revealed your interest in the occult to me, during an interview a few weeks ago.

[Gombar] I am never angry at Miska Bihari. I merely objected to having a truly rational person speak out about things that many people are likely to misinterpret. I think we should avoid publicizing even inadvertently the flood of printed nonsense engulfing us in today's world. It is bad enough that there always will be greedy charlatans claiming to be studying on a scientific basis astrology, graphology, horoscopes, or even spoon bending, for instance. Moreover, they are doing so in the name of the democracy we have won, and on the principle that now everything is permissible. Furthermore, regrettably, there will always be semieducated masses taken in by such charlatans. And I thought years ago that Hungarian society had outgrown this game.

[Szekely] How could Hungarian society have outgrown this game when it was not even exposed to it until just recently? After all, it has only been a year or two that books on this subject can appear in Hungary, and courses and clubs can be organized. In my experience, people long for the imagined magic and want to learn the mysterious signs of their characters and destinies. Perhaps it will be different when some sort of saturation point will have been reached in this area. Although, in my opinion, these things are not entirely unambiguous. Take yourself, for instance. I noticed that you are cautious, scrupulous, and tend to be analytical. And then I read in *Ki Kicsoda* that you were born in September. Which means that you are a Virgo. And it is common knowledge that Virgos are cautious, scrupulous, and tend to be analytical. In other words, there must be something to it, as they say.

[Gombar] This is most dangerous! When someone draws subjective conclusions merely on the basis of superficial impressions, without any concrete evidence, and then attempts to have his subjective conclusions accepted as scientific experience. Your consider me cautious. But it would be more accurate to say that I strive to act deliberately, with foresight.

[Szekely] Is that how you would rate also your action on 24 October, when you ordered the removal, from the Radio Building's entrance, of the memorial plaque commemorating the AVH [State Security Agency] conscripts who died in 1956? Some saw this as opportunism. Others, as a clever tactical move by a person endowed with political common sense.

[Gombar] The reason underlying my decision to do what I did was to finally achieve reconciliation in the country also in this respect. I think that we can preserve on a common memorial plaque the names of all those who

died as needless victims on either side in 1956. But this decision was not based solely on current political considerations. Although I became involved in day-to-day political work on several occasions in my lifetime, I was not very successful at it. I think I am better suited for contemplating politics. That and specific political activity are two different professions.

[Szekely] But how have you become nonpartisan when basically you had been partisan? You were a member of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party]. And, to the best of my knowledge, you were active at one time also in the KISZ [Communist Youth League] Central Committee.

[Gombar] Look, it is not fashionable to say so now, but in 1956 when as an adolescent I joined the MSZMP, for family reasons, and under the influence of what I had experienced up to then, I felt that, yes, that was probably the right thing to do. That the MSZMP's cause was just. And anyone is a liar who claims that a boy of 17 is able to clearly recognize what his own and his nation's interests demand, or that such a boy has a definite ideology.

[Szekely] What is your family background?

[Gombar] My father was a bluecollar worker in Csepel, but both my parents were of peasant stock. I belong to the first generation of intellectuals in our family. Incidentally, that party membership did not last long. Within a year I was expelled from the MSZMP, for having requested my discharge from a military secondary school.

[Szekely] How did that come about?

[Gombar] I was attending a military secondary school, and that is where I lived through the revolution and its aftermath. We in that school were not interested in politics. Planning to become career officers, we looked on civilians with deep disdain and did not understand the confusion that developed toward the end of 1956. The foolish antics of a bunch of civilians, we thought. Prepared to defend ourselves, we were neither bloodthirsty nor gun crazy. We did not look forward to an opportunity to use arms. We did not shout: "Hey, I got a pistol. Let's go!" No. We wandered about Budapest, disorganized. Although they repeatedly wanted to arm us, we did not want arms and tried to keep ourselves away from the confusion. Occasionally we would be assigned officially to defend, say, the AVH personnel on Fo Street, and then again the radar factory.

[Szekely] Yet just the other day you ordered the removal, from the wall at the Radio Building's entrance, of a memorial plaque on which even your own name could easily have been inscribed. I cannot resist a bad pun: You are not a turncoat, you merely changed memorial plaques. Forgive me, but reality's barely conceivable absurdity forced me to say that. Frankly, I would like to trace and understand the process which helped to place you in this chair, quite deservedly in my opinion. But we

are still at the point where you were a cadet in a military secondary school. Did you not receive some sort of intellectual guidance there? Did you not discuss actually why you cadets were about to become career officers, and for what objectives?

[Gombar] We at that age were not interested in final objectives. All such talk was a lot of hot air, in our opinion. We were living under strict military discipline, amidst conditions similar to what Geza Ottlik described in relief in his book *Iskola a hataron* [School on the Border]. We were proud of our toughness, on the one hand; but chafing at the stupid rules, on the other hand. I, too, reached the limit of my endurance and requested my discharge. For the next two years I had to work as an unskilled worker, and only thereafter did I succeed in gaining admission to university. By the way, that secondary school taught a select intake and set fairly high standards. Perhaps that was what drove me toward university. My majors were history and philosophy, and I was absorbing sciences with some sort of cursed, naive faith. At first I studied mainly the history of religion, but then switched to political science when I noticed that the elaboration of politics on a scientific level was lacking in Hungary, despite the fact that the regime attributed great importance to politics.

[Szekely] Upon graduation, nevertheless, you did not immediately become a scientist and researcher. Instead, you first became a KISZ official.

[Gombar] My life is by no means a continuous scientific career. I was sidetracked repeatedly. I worked for the KISZ Central Committee until 1965 or 1966, I believe. For me those three years, too, were a complete disaster. We tried all sorts of things, of course. That was the time when the scientific circles for students started, and we organized international and domestic construction camps. But I was dissatisfied with all this and constantly produced conflicts around myself. I felt that day-to-day political work was not for me, and after a time I was advised to leave. I taught social philosophy for a few years at Budapest Technical University. When the reform process produced the Social Sciences Institute, I was invited to work there. That was the nicest, most productive period of my career to date. My colleagues and I experienced a sense of personal achievement. We discovered and formulated things that became reality in Hungary only several years or decades later. For example, we studied very closely the works of Istvan Bibó already in the 1960's, but in Hungarian public opinion the renaissance of his works occurred only around 1980. We called attention to numerous phenomena in conjunction with society and the economy, and certain issues became important within the entire country after we had called attention to them. Our team was justified in feeling that, with the tools of scientific speculation, it had helped to prepare the changes in Hungary.

[Szekely] From "there," nevertheless, it must not have been difficult to encourage changes. After all, the Social Sciences Institute functioned under the auspices of the party's headquarters.

[Gombar] Undeniably, we were working in the so-called inner circle protected by power. We went to lecture in various parts of the country. All they could say anywhere was that this guy from the institute at the party's headquarters came and said some astonishing things, but who the hell could we report him to?

[Szekely] Don't you sense a certain degree of hypocrisy in this? Can someone credibly call for changes who accepts the principles of a one-party system and the status that the institute lends, and probably is also paid fairly well?

[Gombar] Yes, I think so, if you are really serious. The method of scientific thinking compels one to see both sides of an issue at the same time. As a result of the random course of the various conflicts in the logical process of perception, a person's value judgments can change. I could be reproached, of course, for having regarded that system as unmovable, and for thinking that my leaving it would have been of no avail. There were people who chose open opposition. They sought me out and invited me to join them, causing me numerous moral dilemmas. Today I realize that I should have joined them, but I regarded their objectives as unrealistic. I feared that I might not be invited for any more radio interviews, and would have no opportunity to express my views to the general public, if I joined the opposition openly. You will probably say that this reasoning was opportunism on my part. Of course it was. I have only one excuse: The conviction that the transformation might not have succeeded if there had been no interplay between the opposition outside the party and the reform movement within it, if there had not been "cooperating" persons in the various areas of society.

[Szekely] When did you finally leave the party?

[Gombar] That party gradually became a peculiar sort of conglomerate, incapable of functioning. All kinds of trends and their exact opposites were represented within it. I expected a clean split in the party, but that did not happen. I resigned from the party about the time of that certain "congress." In my opinion, the MSZMP is a helpless grouping of missed opportunities.

[Szekely] Strictly speaking, then, you have become non-partisan. Your published works have indicated for some time that you are not leaning toward either extreme and are able to adopt an objective standpoint. That probably was one of the decisive considerations underlying your appointment as president of Hungarian Radio in this period fraught with uncertainty and rancor.

[Gombar] It is also possible that they did not find anyone else. We all must learn the methods of disseminating information impartially. Regrettably, the crisis that occurred in Hungary a few days ago provided an excellent field for study. But the strange thing is that financial and investment matters keep forcing themselves into the forefront of attention, though I would much prefer to concern myself prima

rily with substantive issues. My expert colleagues and I are constantly racking our brains on how to modernize Hungarian Radio's technical equipment, and to improve the poor reception experienced in Hungary. But if you are distorting my affairs to such an extent, I must admit that I

regard this "radio phase" of my career merely as a transition. As soon as I succeed in finding an energetic and knowledgeable young manager, I will immediately return to my research work. I can hardly wait for my life to become "boring" again.

## POLAND

### Defense Minister Holds 1st Press Conference

#### Excerpts From Conference Statements

91EP0134A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
16-18 Nov 90 pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Marek Sieniawski and Captain Apolinary Wojtys, under the rubric "Press Conference of the Minister of National Defense, Republic of Poland": "The Army Is Our Common Concern"]

[Text] (Own correspondent) On Thursday 15 November the Government Press Office organized a press conference for the minister of national defense at the Office of the Council of Ministers, the first since Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk was appointed to that ministerial post. Several dozen Polish and foreign reporters attended. The conference began with a declaration by Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk. The meeting with the press was attended not only by the minister of national defense but also by the following deputy ministers: Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Div. Gen. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk, Bronislaw Komorowski, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz.

The interest of domestic and foreign reporters in military topics was tremendous. There was no dearth of difficult questions either, and fairly often of controversial ones. Owing to lack of space and pressing deadlines, we shall quote below only those questions and answers which we thought mattered most.

#### Is the Military Needed and, If Yes, What Kind?

POLSKA ZBROJNA: "The impression may arise that only the military is concerned with strengthening our national defense. And yet it is the civilian society that should decide what kind of army we should have. It is the society that must make it clear whether it desires to feel secure. And it seems that this is the issue with which any discussion of the military should begin. Or perhaps the society does not desire the military and then it should be disbanded and the cannon forged into plowshares?"

Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk: "I think that at present the society has plenty of day-to-day concerns of its own and is far from being constantly concerned about questions of national defense. Doubtless we do need such discussion, perhaps even on the forum of the parliament as we already mentioned at one time. I am glad that such a discussion, a very objective and penetrating one, took place at last Monday's meeting of the Council of Ministers which took note of our accomplishments and generally accepted the changes which we undertook to implement."

"For some unknown reason our society associates national defense with the military alone. But, as known, that is not true at all. The military is the strike force in the defense system and plays a substantial but not

exclusive role in that system. Actually, national defense means the effort of the entire society, specific duties of every individual subsector. Lastly, there is the need to coordinate that effort, and I think that in that respect, in particular, much still remains to be done."

POLSKA ZBROJNA: "What defense capability exists in our Armed Forces at present? Mr. Minister, what efforts should be undertaken, in your opinion, so that we may feel secure in our country, a country which has been so severely tested by history?"

According to the minister of national defense, the Polish army provides an adequate safeguard for our national security, the more so considering that the threat of a military conflict has receded as it were. However, there are no guarantees as to the future. The level of defense potential is decided by the national budget, which each year is allocating smaller and smaller funds for national defense. The prospects for the future also may sound pessimistic should this trend persist.

Complementing, as it were, the question of whether the military is needed at all, Deputy Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz voiced the belief that in Europe nowadays there is no room for the kind of war envisaged by the armed forces of Warsaw Pact and NATO and in which these forces had been ready to take part. In Poland too we desire to return to normalcy. At the same time, though, the deputy minister stressed, it should be realized that every country in the world, with the exception of such states as, e.g., the Vatican, maintains its own armed forces. No one yet has conceived a better way of asserting national sovereignty and defending the nation than by maintaining armed forces. Hence, the question of whether we should have an army should be changed to the question of what kind of army we should have. Hence also the attendant problems of how to maintain an adequate degree of equipping and preparedness of the army? Where to find adequate funding for that? Nowadays, every projectile fired during training exercises costs a great deal of money, not to mention artillery shells or missiles. Military pilots also must fly, and this means not only wear of equipment but also consumption of fuel. All this has to be figured in pecuniary terms. It should be borne in mind that if we want to have a well-trained army, that will take money.

Contrary to appearances, reducing the size of the army also costs money, as Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk pointed out. Then also troop deployment has to be altered. The new model of our army, that is, a smaller but more efficient force, also entails substantial expenditures.

#### A Model of the Polish Army

RZECZPOSPOLITA: "Much is being said about the new model of the armed forces. What does that mean, specifically?"

In his reply, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Div. Gen. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk was specific and

made no secret of the fact that the traditional binding military doctrine used to be that we should have an army geared to offensive combat. It had been assumed that we must regroup troops rapidly in the westward direction and engage in combat in the West. Accordingly, the central institutions and the entire armed forces had been, both conditionally and in terms of their tables of organization, split into two parts, one to be used in combat outside this country and the other, the domestic rear echelon, to supply the troops fighting in the West. Now that new military doctrine has been introduced, we notice that it still does not meet our expectations. It is also thought that it is not only military experts who should work out our defensive doctrine.

Replying to the questions about the security of our frontiers, Gen. Stelmaszuk declared that army units in Przemysl and Lublin are being reformed. We shall also transfer some units from western Poland. It should be borne in mind, however, that all this entails huge expenses. For example, the redeployment of a single mechanized division costs about 1 billion zlotys, and in 1989 prices at that.

The reporters also were curious to know why we desire to purchase the military equipment of the former National People's Army of the GDR which is now being auctioned off. Deputy Minister Onyszkiewicz confirmed that we have indeed engaged in talks about the acquisition of certain quantities of Western-produced armaments. However, it is no easy matter to switch entirely from one kind of armaments to another overnight. That is why we are interested in acquiring certain quantities of the armaments of the former armed forces of the GDR. The deputy minister stated that he believes such acquisitions to be worthwhile.

#### We, Our Neighbors, and Warsaw Pact

Many reporters were interested in our diplomatic relations relating to military issues. Answering their questions, Deputy Minister Onyszkiewicz reported on the recent visits of heads of the ministry of national defense to, among other countries, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. He announced visits to Germany and Belgium. These are fruitful contacts which promote building mutual trust.

The Warsaw Pact and its fate were the subject of the next questions. In reply, we were told:

"Warsaw Pact and its military structures no longer are functioning. A commission for making a thorough analysis of the operation of that pact has been appointed. Within that commission a consensus on the operating procedure has been reached by the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian delegations, as well as on the question of allocating armament quotas among the individual countries formally belonging to Warsaw Pact. Joint proposals have been made to liquidate the military structures of the united command. At present our armed forces are 100 percent under the control of the Polish command and Polish authorities. Before this month is over, the

Advisory Political Committee of Warsaw Pact is to meet, but it is not expected to pass a death sentence on Warsaw Pact. That is so because that pact has a certain consultative role to play in the changing Europe."

#### Interpersonal Relations in the Army

Many questions were asked about this topic; among other things, about the treatment of complaints and grievances by the military.

Speaking on this topic, Deputy Minister Bronislaw Komorowski declared that, among other things, the Army's Educational Directorate has started to work on appointing a troops ombudsman who would, on behalf of the minister, serve as a watchdog over the observance of fundamental civil rights of citizens in uniforms. The appointment of confidential representatives of military personnel also is being considered, as is the broadening of the rights of the already existing councils of ensigns, councils of noncommissioned officers, and assemblies of commissioned officers. In the future the assignment of military psychologists to discrete army units also is expected.

#### The Army and the Elections

Answering the questions concerning the participation of the military in the coming presidential elections, Minister Kolodziejczyk placed primary emphasis on the apolitical stance of the persons wearing military uniforms. Deputy Minister Komorowski declared that there is not and should not be any politicking within the army, this being in the interest of not only the armed forces but also our Polish democracy.

A question was also asked concerning the comments of certain presidential candidates on the need for a professional army as the future model of our armed forces. The reporters asked, "Is the Ministry of National Defense actually working on this concept?"

The minister of national defense answered, "Even the richest countries cannot always afford to maintain a professional army." He also declared that the work on a new model of the army will result in professionalizing 50 percent of all posts compared with 33 percent at present. "A professional army, yes, but that will depend on the financial possibilities of the state, and also on the international situation," said the minister.

Concerning this issue, Deputy Minister Komorowski declared that forming a volunteer army is not just a question of financial capability but also one of linking such an army to the entire democratic system. An army of conscripted soldiers has greater chances for remaining an army of citizens in uniform.

#### Vexations of Day-to-Day Life

Sole family wage earners are nowadays headlined in the press. Hence also the many questions on this topic. In reply, the minister of national defense said that, among other things, every citizen should be equal under the

constitution. Before the [Second World] War there had been no deferments and no exemptions either from the draft. Every young Pole was aware of the need to fulfill his duty to the Fatherland, and planned accordingly his personal life and affairs. That was just and fair. Nowadays many draft exemptions are being granted. Ever since sole family wage earners became eligible for such exemptions the number of youthful newlyweds increased thirteenfold. A substantial number of young farmers also are being exempted from the draft.

Each year out of the 260,000 potential draftees as many as 114,000 cannot be drafted.... The troop shortage at present has reached as much as 20 percent.

And lastly a POLSKA ZBROJNA reporter asked the following question, after the press conference was ended:

"A bus driver earns nearly 2 million zlotys whereas the salary of an army captain is 1,500,000 zlotys. What do you say to that?"

The minister of national defense voiced his belief that persons in professional military service have the feeling, for the most part, of accomplishing a mission and are clearly aware of the difficulties being encountered by the entire country, the entire society. "We all bear in a worthy manner our share of material difficulties and this fact should not weaken commitment to the performance of soldierly duties," added the minister.

#### Future Army Adjustments

91EP0134B Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
16-18 Nov 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "A Model for the 1990's: From the Comments of Minister of National Defense Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk"]

[Text] The Polish defense doctrine, or perhaps rather the Polish military doctrine, is becoming definitely defense oriented, not just on paper but in reality. This approach is resulting in fundamental and definite changes in the structure of our armed forces, along with a definite reduction in the army's offensive capabilities. By year end the army should reach a size of 305,000 personnel, whereas in 1988 the ceiling was more than 400,000. Such a rapid reduction in the size of the army entails many difficulties and problems, including human ones.

Intensive work on a new model of the armed forces, adapted to the present and predicted situation is continuing. We shall conditionally term this model "The Armed Forces of the 1990's." Under this model the ceiling on troop size will be at the level of 230,000 to 250,000 soldiers. This model also allows for the signing of the Vienna agreements, which impose arms quota limits on all the participants. These transformations are accompanied by substantial personnel changes.

During this year 34 generals have left the army, and 22 more will part with it during the first half of next year. At present 94 generals are on active duty in the army. In

1991 their number will shrink to 88. For comparison, in 1984 there were 188 generals, whereas in 1939 the Polish Armed Forces had 96 generals. In Belgium there is one general for every 2,200 soldiers; in the United States, [one] for every 2,000; in Great Britain, [one] for every 1,500; in Denmark, [one] for every 1,000; in Italy, [one] for every 762, and in Hungary, [one] for every 769, whereas in Poland we have one general for every 2,500 soldiers.

We are in the formative stage of a new educational system designed to match the aspirations and possibilities of young Poles. We desire that the duty of military service should not mean a so-called hiatus in the curriculum vitae of young people.

As for military expenditures in other countries (data for 1989), in the FRG they amounted to \$634 per capita; in Great Britain, \$602; in Belgium, \$441, in Czechoslovakia, \$188, in Sweden, \$563, and in Greece, \$331. And in our country? \$39.8 per capita—an amount that has at present declined by 15 percent.

The picture of the economic and military Europe is changing. Warsaw Pact now exists only in theory, properly speaking, and other operating principles are being adopted. National defense and the ensuing obligations rest on the shoulders of us all.

#### Chief of General Staff on Changes

91EP0134C Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
16-18 Nov 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "What Changes in the Armed Forces? From the Comments of Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Division General Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk"]

[Text]

- Separation of the powers of the minister of national defense and his office from strictly military specializations.
- The office of the minister of national defense would exercise jurisdiction over the financial and personnel policies of the ministry, the Institute of Strategic Studies, and other central institutions.
- The Armed Forces would be headed by a general inspector of the armed forces or by a General Staff chief appointed for time of war by the supreme commander.
- The general inspector of the Armed Forces (or the chief of General Staff) would command the General Staff, the logistics, and combat training directorates, and other army directorates.
- The logistics directorate would combine the duties of the present-day Quartermaster in Chief and the directorate of the Main Technical Inspector.
- The general inspector of the Armed Forces would command three armed services: the Army, the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense Force, and the Navy.

- The army consists of four military districts: Pomeranian, Silesian, Mazurian, and Little Poland (Malopolski).
- The troops in the districts would include, though without formal subordination, reserve forces of the supreme commander as well as rapid response forces that could be transferred anywhere as needed.
- There will be no major changes within the Air Force and the Antiaircraft Defense.
- The principal changes within the Navy would concern chiefly the acquisition of defense-oriented modern equipment.
- So far the percentile proportion of central institutions [e.g., the Institute of Strategic Studies] to the Armed Forces as a whole has been 1.1. Under the new model, of the Armed Forces it will hover at about 0.6 percent.
- The rear echelon will be based on the civilian economy.

### Need for Alternatives in Weapons Procurement Voiced

91EP0081A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
24 Oct 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jozef J. Pawelec: "The State of the Army: Restructuring Armaments"]

[Text] The share of arms production in Poland's total industrial production is meager; in former years it did not exceed three percent. The sale of 1.5 percent of production, however, did bring in a considerable income (approximately six percent). This industry has allowed us to supply the Polish Army [WP] with the basic light equipment, armaments, and uniforms.

We have been importing heavy equipment, such as artillery rocket launchers, heavy artillery, planes, combat helicopters, most ships along with their armaments and also many types of means of communications from the USSR. A heavy transport base accompanied these—the Zil, Ural, Kraz, and Kamaz. It is estimated that, in the past, imports constituted, in terms of cost, approximately two-thirds of the military's total equipment. This fact alone has a strong impact on the courses of the future development of the domestic industry and the scientific base. It is known that we can no longer restrict ourselves exclusively to the Soviet base, both for political and technical reasons. At the same time, we can neither switch over suddenly to Western armaments nor can we replace import with domestic production. It should be noted that we import ammunition (subcaliber) from the Soviet Union for many rocket launchers and even for T-72 tanks. Likewise we import spare parts and some subassemblies for our other equipment from them. In addition, the growing prices of Soviet equipment (for example, the MiG-19 costs 140 billion zlotys), its inferior quality and political considerations cause us to be interested in Western armaments models and to intensify domestic production.

Thus, we must consider three parallel developmental routes for the near future:

- (1) To continue cooperation with the USSR.
- (2) To intensify domestic production.
- (3) To initiate cooperation with the West.

This situation breaks down in the following way in the individual categories of armaments.

**Ammunition and Light Armaments:** A good domestic base exists for the production of pistols, rifles, machine guns and small-caliber antiaircraft guns. It has certain free processing capabilities available which should be used for foreign coproduction and export.

**Guided Missiles:** We produce an antitank wire-guided missile, an antitank self-homing missile as well as an antiaircraft guided missile. However, it is becoming necessary to modernize both models, particularly the antiaircraft model. We must establish foreign coproduction in this area.

**Tanks and Tracked Vehicles:** Our industry has extensive production capabilities. The military is drastically restricting its purchases and export is likewise experiencing a sudden drop. The existing base should be switched to other production, for example, special chassis, the building of a new model of armored personnel carrier, or civilian production.

**Radar and Optoelectronics:** This is the field with the greatest vitality. It has available a somewhat modern industrial base and scientific supply base. Attempts are being made to coproduce with the West in such areas as thermal imaging and homing radars. These initiatives should be supported.

**Reconnaissance, Command, and Communications Systems:** We lack experience in the area of creating these kinds of complex systems. Only certain composite elements of such systems are available, for example, in the area of radar reconnaissance (intermediate distances, the lower spectral bands—L, S, and X) and in the area of communications at tactical levels (a mobile digital communication junction, the Tuberoza radio station). It appears to be necessary to set up coproduction or to acquire at least one sample of a complete system from the West.

**Engineering and Chemical Equipment:** No substantial modernization is required.

**Planes and Helicopters:** The high cost and modest quantitative need for planes have dictated a decided shift to importing these armaments (from the West?). We can produce helicopters ourselves or through coproduction. We should step up our efforts to equip helicopters with modern systems for guiding the means of battle.

**Ships and Naval Equipment:** We should continue to import large items and produce smaller ones domestically. We should aim to equip ships with domestically produced firing systems and electronic systems.

The previous summary speaks of goals and directions, but not of the forms and methods for achieving these goals. This second part of the prognosis is extremely important, since we have already outlined goals for many decades without effect. I do not consider myself sufficiently competent on the subject to propose the organizational forms which will lend themselves to be directly implemented. Some variants will be offered from which to choose. However, this should only be done after this information has been supplemented with other ideas formulated by people who have the expertise, the imagination and a high degree of responsibility.

At the beginning of this article I proposed somewhat of a "hard thrust." Since an enormous gap separates the state of Polish military technology from its counterpart in the West, especially in modern, electronic armaments, and since we do not have the money to purchase armaments or the conditions to get domestic production going, we are left with purchasing this equipment outside the normal route.

Specifically, I propose that we approach the U.S. government to request that it transfer to Poland gratis the armaments left by the American armies withdrawing from Europe. Of course, this would require the appropriate political declarations (perhaps even approaching NATO), but the climate in the U.S. for stabilizing the situation in Poland is favorable, both because of the nationalities ties and for geopolitical reasons. The U.S. Army certainly is not interested in the distant and expensive transport of this equipment. Moreover, I do not think that the allies of the U.S. are all that interested in acquiring it. We have already had precedents in this sphere (Vietnam, Turkey).

If this "hard thrust" does not succeed for some reason or if it is only partly successful, I would advise (likewise independent of the first initiative) that we embark upon a military alliance with one of the Western countries, for example, France. For our part, the idea of this alliance would be to acquire new technology and for the ally's part it would be the human element, the Polish soldier, known for his courage and valor.

We already had one such alliance before the war which had an important result, in spite of what is said. On the

third day of his campaign, Hitler encountered not one, but three enemies. Poland became the reason for the outbreak of a world war which was, because of this alliance, both shorter and ultimately victorious.

France has excellent electronic systems (RITA, Astrate, Syracuse, DIRANE, RAMSES, and HADES) and excellent rocket systems (Exocet, Crotale, SAMP). The French defense minister visited Poland in May 1990 and encouraged coproduction. In the first stage we are to aim to get an assembly shop for French equipment started. Then we would enter the phase of perfecting and embarking upon close coproduction up through the phase of trading production and technical knowhow, since we have capable engineers. Had we already entered into contact with France, the technical level of the WP [Polish Army] would have to be fundamentally reorganized. It would have to be organized along the model of the Delegation Generale pour l'Armement and would above all have to be civilianized. For this venture to succeed, a basic change in thinking with regard to the affairs of the army and armaments would be essential. New people would be needed who would be imaginative and would be fascinated with technology, just as the designers of the first Polish planes were. They would also have to find themselves "at the top," for in an unusually highly hierarchical army not too much can be achieved through spontaneous initiatives, except for causing certain harm to the so-called economic activity which is conducted by those in uniform.

I am simply ashamed of such beggary. I am also in favor of liquidating all trade or production cooperatives in which soldiers participate. The army must be clean. Only then can we count on a favorable attitude from society and on help from the press, from radio, and from television. We should revive technical clubs and organize competitions and equipment displays for the civilian population. We should expand the work of the Military Studies Society and depart somewhat from science in a vacuum (of conservatories for a narrow group of specialists) in favor of meetings with businessmen and their communities. Public cocktails for various occasions, festive returns from army exercises and, yes, even balls to which the mass media are invited: this is the direction to which we should aim, the direction practiced in the West.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## Steel Production To Be Restructured

91CH0125A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURT  
ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Nov 90 p 20

[Article by Jacqueline Henard: "The Giant in Kosice Will Remain"]

[Text] The unique burdens of the Czechoslovak economy can be best portrayed with two numbers: per capita of the population (15.5 million people), one metric ton of crude oil is consumed and one metric ton of steel is produced. The raw ore comes almost exclusively from the Krivoi Rog mining region in the Soviet Union, between 11 million and 16.5 million metric tons per year. Czechoslovakia is a participant in a joint CEMA project in Krivoi Rog for mining and processing on site, in which it has already invested 6 billion korunas (at the commercial exchange rate, equal to 384 million German marks [DM]). Terminating the investment will cost an additional 9 billion to 14 billion korunas.

This is currently being discussed in Prague and in steel centers because the ore from Krivoi Rog has a high sulfur content (pellets: 11.5 percent), and the distance between Krivoi Rog and Kosice is great. A 1,200-km Soviet-gauge rail connection laid just for this leads from Krivoi Rog to Kosice in Eastern Slovakia, where there is a defrosting facility for up to 40 railcars and a transfer site to change to Central European [standard] gauge rail. In Kosice itself, a city without its own ore or coal deposits and with little water reserves, a gigantic land area of 760 hectares was set aside for a foundry during the Stalin years. It began operations in 1964. The Eastern Slovak steel plant VSZ [Eastern Slovak Enterprises] now has an annual capacity of 4.5 million metric tons.

The directors of the gigantic factory are uncomfortable with their dependence on the Soviet Union. They would prefer to draw up to 30 percent of their ore requirements from the world market: the best would be from across the Danube, which would require, however, numerous loading transfers. They do not consider the raw material supply from the Soviet Union to be endangered, because the distance from Krivoi Rog to the nearest port from which the Soviets could serve world markets is 800 km. But it is difficult to negotiate over price with the Soviets, to make it clear to them that the high-sulfur-content ore which has an iron content of under 50 percent is not worth world market prices for ore of normal sulfur content (3 to 4 percent).

The VSZ is the largest employer in the region, and according to the steel plans of the government in Prague should not be shut down, unlike the steel furnaces in Moravian Ostrava. Of the 4.5 million annual metric tons, 500,000 metric tons are heavy plate to be delivered to Kvitkovice in the Ostrava region for further processing. The foundries in Kvitkovice (1.6 million tons, primarily for machinery construction) are to be shut down first, because of their overwhelming burdens on

the environment. There will still be the Kuncice steel factory (3.5 million tons) in the Ostrava region, and it has an enclosed conveyor belt system.

Another important steel location is Poldi-Kladno near Prague (1 million metric tons), which is the only high-grade steel producer in Czechoslovakia. Smaller locales such as Pobrezova in Slovakia (taking in scrap metal, primarily producing pipe), Chomutov (seamless pipe under Mannesmann license) and Radek have an additional capacity of 1.8 million metric tons annually. Forty percent of Czechoslovak steel is still produced in Siemens-Martin furnaces, and the relationship between area and length of production is unfavorable. The percentage of continuous casting is only 9.2 percent (in the EC: 87 percent).

There are currently 160,000 people working in the Czechoslovak steel industry. In a period of time not yet precisely specified, the government wants to cut capacity in half. It is heard that by the year 2000, they want to be down to a capacity of 12 million tons. The degree of personnel cuts which will be associated with this can be illustrated by the example of Kosice: of the 26,000 employees, 17,000 work in the foundry, and by 1994 the number is to be reduced to 5,400.

Kosice is the only foundry for flat sheet metal products in the country, and is considered a "well-integrated foundry" by Western experts. It would be relatively simple to bring it up to Western standards. There is currently one blast furnace with a 2,400 cubic meter capacity, and two others with the capacity of 1,800 cubic meters, one of which is to be enlarged up to 2,400 cubic meters. The third is to be held as a "cold reserve." The foundry itself gives visitors the impression of being neglected. There are not any indoor air filtration systems, and sulfur is not removed from exhaust gases.

Energy supply is partially covered by an internal 800 megawatt powerplant. The coal for it comes from Ostrava: coal mining is also a losing proposition in Czechoslovakia. About 600 megawatts comes from external sources. In a few days, Kosice is supposed to be converted from a state-owned factory into a publicly-held corporation. After that, it will be controlled by the Office for Privatization in Bratislava. The directors hope for restructuring modeled on the Austrian state industries, whereby the concept of ancillary expenses is (still) not clearly defined. People in Eastern Slovakia still are greatly concerned by the proximity to the Soviet Union. The Soviet west border has been closed for months. It is repeatedly heard that people who are willing to emigrate are building up on the other side of the border. This will increase the social problems coming to the Kosice region.

## HUNGARY

### Import Liberalization, Need for Protectionism Assessed

91CH0096A Budapest FIGYELŐ in Hungarian  
25 Oct 90 p 9

[Article by Ministry of International Economic Relations officials Mrs. Laszlo Koczka and Laszlo Balogh: "Import Liberalization; Do We Need a Protection System?"—first paragraph is FIGYELŐ introduction]

[Text] On the basis of the experiences of the past year and a half, there are already some conclusions to be drawn from the effects of the liberalization that had been decided upon last year. On the plus side, we have had a decline in shortage situations, and an increase in the ratio of Western machine imports. What to do next is the question currently debated by officials of the Ministry of International Economic Relations.

In 1991, the policy of liberalization will have to be continued under drastically different foreign economic, and changed political, circumstances, as the expected changes in our trade with the countries of Central and East Europe, but also our internal economic and political developments, will create new conditions regarding the scope of liberalization. Under the terms of the government program and our agreements with the World Bank, the liberalized segment of our imports in 1991, projected against 1988 turnover figures, must reach 80 percent of the total. In other words, the scope of liberalized products is expected to increase by 17 percent. In the future, as spelled out in our economic policy goals and our assumed international obligations, the competition stimulating effects of liberalization will become significantly more pervasive. The ratio of products that can potentially compete with imports will rise from 33 percent this year, to more than 60 percent. In at least 40 of our 50 industrial subbranches the competition is completely vertical, from basic material to the final product. Besides its positive effects, this has also caused problems for domestic producers. The utilization of existing capacities is deteriorating and unemployment is on the rise, but these negative effects must definitely be tolerated in the interest of accelerating structural change.

#### Drawbacks

Some are of the opinion that by 1991, imports should be completely liberalized. In the case of Hungary this would mean that only products subject to licensing under accepted international norms (i.e., weapons, drugs, precious metals, etc.), would be retained in that category. The main argument in support of this strategy is that it would allow the structure-changing and competition-stimulating effects of liberalization to fully assert themselves. As for our balance of payments, such a step would not constitute a real danger, and in the case of some products, import competition may even lead to price declines.

This view is open to argument. International experiences show that on the average most market economies have taken five to six years to liberalize their imports to give themselves enough time to gear up for increased competition. The conversion in the Central and East European region to a dollar-cleared system of payments will in itself accelerate structural change. Keeping this in mind, there are some areas where, come 1991, licensing requirements will definitely continue to have to be kept in place, particularly for the following reasons:

Certain branches which, for the most part, had been built up to produce for export to the CEMA countries will be more acutely affected than others by the imminent decline in ruble trade and the "conversion" slated for 1991. These include, for example, the transportation and communications equipment manufacturing branches.

Naturally even in such instances the users have an interest in import liberalization. They can take comfort in the fact that the purpose of licensing is not to restrict; it is aimed merely at giving those affected an opportunity to see in advance how the trade processes work. There are even plans to permit the automatic licensing of, or the application of tariff contingencies to, products falling within this category up to a certain volume.

#### Debates

Food production in most countries is government subsidized. Besides tariffs, our biggest trading partner, the EEC, also subjects imports to what is called "skimming," which can amount to several times the size of the tariff. Under these circumstances, with foreign market prices strongly influenced by a competition of subsidies—to the point where they are often suppressed below production costs—our domestic food economy can also not be exposed to import competition without building up an adequate protection system that is in accordance with international rules. Hence wide-scale liberalization of products produced by the food industry can only be considered after the implementation of a new agricultural order that also takes into account the results of the GATT negotiations, and the development of a system of tariffs that reflects the new order. So by 1991, we plan to liberalize only a few, less important food industry products and mixed fodder. On the other hand, practically all types of import input used by the food economy have already been liberalized.

Most of the debate today is focused on whether or not imports of consumer goods should be further liberalized. Experience has shown that it is the import of precisely these types of products to which liberalization has given the greatest boost.

Moreover, most of our consumer good imports are coming from ruble-cleared trade. It is obvious, therefore, that after the "conversion," imports from our traditional hard currency markets will drastically rise, not only because of potential improvements in the competitive position of such imports, but also because of our gradual shift to hard currency imports. This may result in as

much as a 200 million to 300 million dollar jump in imports, which given our balance of payments already strained by the conversion, is hardly acceptable. As a temporary solution to finding a more liberal way of managing our imports, we might opt for a "global quota system."

It is perfectly reasonable for us to expect that, as imports become cheaper, liberalization also will lead to lower domestic prices. What we have found so far, however, is that this effect has been extremely inconsistent in manifesting itself. This despite the fact that most of the consumer goods liberalized in 1989 were machine industry and telecommunications products, which one would assume would be cheaper to procure from imports than what it would cost to make them at home. In some instances, particularly in the case of telecommunications products, price levels today are indeed more realistic than they were in the past. In other instances, however (e.g., refrigerators, freezers) more expensive imports have actually led to increases in the price of domestic products. And in those cases where imports are already more expensive than similar domestic products, there is even less reason to expect prices to decline.

#### Changes in Consumer Good Imports (million dollars)

Period	Stock of Orders	Actual Turnover*
Jan-Aug 1988	85.1	46.4
Jan-Aug 1989	168.1	85.5
Jan-Aug 1990	415.5	178.8

\* The size of the projected turnover for the whole year is better reflected in the changing of contract-supported orders.

#### Competition?

Most of the consumer goods which still have not been liberalized are light industry, and specifically textile industry products. Underscoring the need to keep the licensing requirement in place for textile and clothing industry products is the fact that, under the terms of the textile agreement, we, as exporters, have already agreed to adhere to a "self-imposed" quota. By liberalizing the sector, we would only weaken our negotiating position, and as importers would unilaterally expose ourselves to unrestricted competition.

And finally, there are areas where it is not really import licensing that restricts imports, but other health, quality, etc., regulations. Typically these would include human pharmaceuticals, but also construction materials. Although in 1991, these kinds of imports will still have to be licensed, aside from requiring adherence to certain health, labor, etc., standards, they do not really affect imports.

As the licensing requirement is removed from most of our trade, domestic production becomes increasingly exposed to import competition. In this respect our plans for next year represent a qualitative change. A change aimed at ensuring that the protection system we devise

for domestic production is in accordance with the rules of international trade. The internationally accepted means of doing this is by imposing tariffs within the perimeters of the GATT regulations. At the same time, the issue of tariff cuts which from the point of view of our domestic economic renewal efforts we also believe are called for, must somehow be brought into the ongoing tariff negotiations so that we can secure certain tariff concessions from our partners.

The competition which as a result of import liberalization has become increasingly intense, can, under exceptional and temporary circumstances, also make it necessary to raise the tariff level in order to protect domestic industry. This can be autonomously done in the case of products for which tariff levels were never specifically established in previous tariff negotiations. Other products require a joint agreement among the partners involved before any changes can be made to the tariff structure.

#### Agricultural Regulatory System

In view of the fact that the creation in Hungary of an agricultural regulatory system is still continuing, the tariff policy measures described earlier only affect a very narrow group of agricultural and food industry products. In the case of these products it may become necessary to reexamine the existing tariff levels, and in some instances even raise the rates in accordance with the agricultural and tariff agreements that have come out of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In addition to overhauling the tariff system, we also need to establish other means of market protection. The rules of international trade allow all countries to take steps against imports which for whatever reason the exporter tries to market at a lower price in the target country than in its own. Once the fact of dumping and the resulting losses are determined, the importing country has the right to levy an antidumping tariff. The details of the antidumping process are precisely spelled out in the Antidumping Code established under GATT. Among other things it provides a definition of dumping, and guarantees the exporting firm the opportunity during the review process to defend and support with facts its own position. The mechanism governing the Hungarian antidumping process is based in its entirety on the above mentioned GATT Code to which our country is a signatory.

The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade also recognizes the concept of market interference. Sudden significant increases in the import volume of given product without apparent reason—even if not traceable to ill intentions—may entail serious losses for domestic producers. In such instances GATT allows the affected country to institute temporary restrictive measures in consultation with the other country in question, aimed at repairing or preventing such losses. If faced with such a

situation, the Hungarian authorities are prepared to assess necessary tariff supplements or volume quotas for

[Box, p 9]

Partly in order to fulfill our international obligations, and partly in order to eliminate tariff disparities that have become untenable also because of the liberalization, in 1991 regulatory changes will be implemented that will affect customs tariffs.

At the Tokyo Round of negotiations under GATT in 1978, we had made tariff reductions for a variety of products contingent on the full removal of discriminatory quantitative restrictions imposed by the Common Market on Hungarian exports. Effective 1 January 1990, the EEC with one stroke of the pen, removed the discriminatory restrictions it had applied to Hungary. In turn we agreed to reduce our tariffs in three stages, in 1990, 1992, and 1995, respectively. In light of our budgetary situation, the step scheduled to be taken in 1990, was postponed by the government until 1991, which our partners have accepted. These tariff reductions will affect nearly 400 products, and will in addition also put an end to the most blatant disparities. At the same time, based on 1989 import levels, these measures will also reduce our budgetary revenues by almost 3 billion forints.

Pursuant to the Uruguay Round of the GATT tariff negotiations, and with a view to accelerating the modernization of domestic production, the Customs Tariffs Committee has recommended that tariff reductions be introduced already in 1990, even before the multi-stage tariff reductions are scheduled to begin, particularly in selected areas of technical development, environmental protection and energy savings. The elimination of huge existing tariff disparities in many areas (e.g., machine part end-products) has also become imperative because of the liberalization of imports. These tariff reductions will—on the basis of 1989 import figures—also reduce budgetary revenues by almost 1.6 billion forints. The introduction of these kinds of tariff reductions has been put off by the government until 1991.

In the Customs Tariffs Committee specific proposals have been put forward on the basis of a representative assessment of the effects of our shift to a new system of trade and monetary clearance with the East European countries starting in 1991 (in the case of the Soviet Union, on the basis of our projected imports in 1991), aimed in part at the introduction of tariffs, and in part at the synchronization of tariff rates. According to preliminary calculations, the budgetary impact of the tariff reductions connected with the conversion is a nearly 5 billion forint decline in budgetary revenues.

## POLAND

### Farm Machinery Production, Sales Improve

91EP00904 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 9 Oct 90 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "After Shock Therapy, 'Agromet' Is Getting Better"]

[Text] Back in 1989, farm equipment deliveries were lower than in 1988, and the downturn is even worse this year.

Aleksander Pruszkowski, Agromet company director, says: "We had the worst situation during the first five months. The decline in the demand for farm machines was so sudden that there was the danger of a complete breakdown in production. We presented reports to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry, the Speaker of the Sejm, the Deputy Speaker of the Senate, Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz, and the chairman of the Polish National Bank. We wrote: Sales are tragic. It is essential to set up inexpensive rural credit."

During the first quarter of this year, production of the farm machine branch reached a value of 443.9 billion zlotys and sales, 327.5 billion.

Of course, things were not exactly the same everywhere. Factories in Slupsk and Strzelce Opolskie did well, but even the increased production was unable to satisfy the demand. The situation was far worse for plants in Grudziadz, Brzeg, Czarna Bialostocka, Dobre Miasto, and elsewhere.

Information from the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] concerning the outcome of audits made of deliveries of farm equipment and tractors in 1989-90 unfortunately covers only these five dismal months. NIK auditors have calculated that despite the fact that at the time we were 40 percent of the way into the current year, we had reached only 28.3 percent of last year's production for tractors, 22.1 percent for tractor seeders [siewnik ciagnikowy], and 21 percent for front-end loaders. Estimates were that machinery was being used to 32.4 percent of capacity in Czarna Bialostocka, 40 percent in Opalenica, and 49.2 percent in Slupsk. In many cases there was only one work shift.

The farm machine factories' debt was usually greater than the uncollected debt owed them. The mechanism worked like this: prices rose, sales fell, and inventory increased. There was no improvement in profitability, despite the rise in prices. Among the reasons the NIK auditors listed was the failure to contain costs, improve quality, and so on.

They also noted that the sales of machinery were in disarray, a fact obvious to the naked eye. They had here a system of quarterly orders, which were set up without regard for the market. Any proposals scientific institutes made regarding improvements for supplying machinery to agriculture found their way into a drawer.

The farm machine branch simply took full advantage of the privileges a monopoly enjoys. Given the old price

ratios, there has not even been the problem of reduced demand. Because Polish agriculture has never had enough machinery or equipment, even factory rejects have been selling like hot cakes. In such a situation the shock therapy of reduced demand was strongly indicated. As Director Pruszkowski considers the efforts to restore health, he says: "We started reducing production costs. We trimmed employment. We got out of the more expensive cooperation agreements."

Some activation in the sales of farm machinery was noticeable even back before the harvest. Since that time, demand has been constantly growing, despite the fact that the preferential credit the farmers' social-professional organizations fought for proved hard to come by in practice. On the one hand, there was [the issue of] price familiarity, and on the other, there was the cash flow to rural areas (for example, from grain sales). It is true that demand has not reached last year's level yet, but it is still hard to buy some machinery, like potato-harvesting combines and rotary mowing machines.

The first changes have also appeared in the system of sales. The Peasant Self-Help [Samopomoc Chlopska] farm machine warehouses and Agromy outlets, which have traditionally handled sales of farm equipment, have been joined by Agromet plants (in Sniadowo, Ostrow Mazowiecka, Bielsk Podlaski, and Dabrowa Biskupia, for example) and private dealers. Some state [agricultural] machine stations [POM] and agricultural circles cooperatives have shown interest in selling machinery. The assumption which has been adopted is that if a farmer wants to buy a piece of farm equipment, there should be a store for him not more than 20 kilometers away.

There are 40 companies with a total of 32,600 employees engaged in the production of farm machinery. The NIK auditors think that farm machine factories are excellent candidates for private ownership, and Director Pruszkowski assures us that the plants are actually headed in that direction. More than one company would be glad to enter coproduction with some foreign producer that is wealthy and also has modern technology available, but at the moment foreign capital seems less eager than usual. There has been a drastic decline in the demand for farm equipment abroad too. Talks are under way with various western companies. Only one farm in three has a tractor, after all, and only two percent of the farms under 10 hectares use mechanical milkers. Potato harvesting is

mechanized on 23 percent of such farms, and the application of organic fertilizers is mechanized on 32 percent. The USSR is probably a large sales market for the Polish farm machine industry, provided that private farming is reinstated there.

"We don't want preferential treatment," Director Pruszkowski says, "but we could use some measures to stimulate increased demand and therefore a rise in production within the farm machinery branch. We are grateful that Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz suspended the sales tax on spare parts, but the exemption lasts only until the end of October, and it would be a good thing to continue it for the rest of this year and all of next year."

#### Regression Noted in Extensive Patterns of Agricultural Production

91EP0084A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 20-21 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Edmund Szot: "A Step Backwards: The Effects of Recessions in the Countryside"]

[Text] Nobody really knows just what the current rural economic situation is like. The fact that the entire annual production of the Ursus Mechanical Plants has already been bought up and that the demand for farm machines has been growing since this past June might lead us to conclude that farmers have incomes higher than they are admitting.

The fact that the rural population is presently driving up the price of housing in town could also seem to be proof. "Country bumpkins" are buying cars, video players, and color television sets, because who can afford them today? Such things can seem persuasive to those urban dwellers who are not well informed about the rural situation.

As usual, the truth of the matter is more complicated. The preponderance of the evidence points more to a clear decline in farmers' incomes than to material success. It is convincing to compare production costs and average wholesale prices for farm products, for example, or to contrast the level of the means of production bought this year and last.

Milk production is presently the least profitable agricultural specialty. All comparisons show this to be true. Below we are presenting a table showing the calculations of certain voivodship centers for agricultural progress [WOPR], which performed the study for Rural Solidarity's National Center for Studies and Analyses.

WOPR Headquarters	Bojanowo (Leszno)	Grzmiąca (Koszalin)	Łosiew (Opole)	Marszew (Kalisz)	Sitno (Zamość)	Boguchwala (Rzeszów)
Cost of producing a liter of milk (in zlotys)	738	796	830	1085	832	1284
Wholesale price per liter (in zlotys)	620	586	600	500	500	485
Profitability of production (in percent)	84	74	72	46	60	38

This analysis covers data as of 16 July 1990. Since that time, wholesale milk prices have not really increased, but production costs have, as the result of the rise in fuel prices. It is worth emphasizing that production costs were calculated assuming an annual milk output of 4,000 liters per cow—the national average is about 3,250 liters—and, in one instance (Bojanowo), the figure used was 5,964 liters.

Dr. Tadeusz Borek, director of the National Center for Studies and Analyses, explains that wholesale milk prices are actually lower than the figures put out by the financial departments of the voivodship offices would indicate.

A farmer who suffers a loss on milk production tries to deflect the loss by raising other prices, but the increase cannot go beyond the level of demand. Fortunately, demand is strong, except for dairy products.

Hog raising has become a relatively profitable specialty now. Profitability calculated in a similar manner using figures from last September for live hog production by voivodship were as follows: Poznan—112 percent; Leszno—102 percent; Olsztyn—99 percent; and Zamość—97 percent (modern methods) and 87 percent (traditional methods). But these calculations were made for test farms [gospodarstwa wdrożeniowe], which are usually run somewhat better than the average farm. Production profitability of 100 percent does not mean that the farmer just breaks even, because the production cost includes a fee for the farmer's work.

Raising slaughter beef is somewhat less profitable than hog raising. The disparity is greater here because of the significant differences in wholesale prices and in the natural conditions of animal husbandry, among other things. Voivodship profitability indexes are as follows: Olsztyn—108 percent; Poznan—100 percent; Leszno—88 percent; and Zamość—94 percent (modern methods) and 80 percent (traditional methods).

When a farmer took cash out of his drawer a year ago, he looked around first of all to see who could be bribed to help him buy fertilizer or bricks. It was some time later before he could obtain the goods he was interested in, and he often treated them as a capital deposit. Now it is

possible to buy a commodity without paying a bribe, but the money does not go nearly so far.

Farmers bought 32,100 tons of fertilizers in June; 19,000 in July; and 50,200 in August, according to Dr. Borek. Compared to last year, these figures represent 18.1, 12.7, and 18.6 percent, respectively. The figures for concentrated feed are 72,500 tons in June (or 26.6 percent of last year); 55,600 tons in July (27.5 percent); and 47,900 in August (24.5 percent).

The conclusion is simple: agriculture is going through a process of regression, as expressed in lower consumption of the means of production, that is, an extension of production, as economists predicted this past spring. They made the prediction without giving any particular warning. Instead, they presented the case as sort of a temporary historical necessity resulting from the overall decline in the demand for food.

On the other hand, extension does not help reduce unit production costs, which remain high, while only the demand for food is lower. Nor does it not help decision-making about production specialization, which has been one of the main factors in cost reduction all over the world. In "difficult times"—and times now are difficult, without any quotation marks—a farmer plays it safe by producing in many different areas. (In Poland, people have always played it safe this way.) The farmer calculates that he will make up on grain whatever he loses on milk. If livestock does not prove profitable, he will make something on beets, tobacco, and so on.

It would be nonsense to mechanize all areas of production on Poland's average five-hectare farm.

Dr. Borek says convincingly: "This is one reason a clear farm policy is needed. The more the farmer knows about his future conditions, the higher he can set his highjump bar."

The farmer in Poland does not know much about his future, unfortunately. That is why he sets the bar so low. He does not so much jump over the bar. He simply crawls over it. Furthermore, he is both too weak and too old to be condemned.

## YUGOSLAVIA

**Serbian Agriculture Minister Opposes FEC Policies**

91BA0143A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 90  
pp 18-20

[Interview with Serbian Minister for Agriculture Veljko Simin by Sumadinka Radonjic; place and date not given: "Who Feeds Yugoslavia?"]

[Text] In Yugoslavia, agrarian policy is pursued for the most part on the federal level and, for the most part, to the great dissatisfaction of Serbia. We spoke with Veljko Simin, 49, the Serbian minister for agriculture, about why this is the case today and how things could be different as early as tomorrow.

[Radonjic] Does Yugoslavia have the same type of agrarian policy that developed European countries have?

[Simin] Unfortunately, it does not! The countries of the European Community have concentrated their national budgets and the majority of the European Community budget on agriculture and food production. The entire subsidy approach in Europe, especially food production, is based on a long-term goal: the creation of prosperity. And there is no prosperity without an abundant, wide assortment of quality food!

[Radonjic] What role do subsidies play?

[Simin] The current subsidies are not enough to set development in motion and to halt many years of decline, which is their purpose.

If they are not part of a system of long-term measures, and if they are sizable, subsidies cannot yield genuine results.

The subsidies are also aimed in the wrong direction. Subsidizing pesticides and mineral fertilizers from the budget improves the economic situation of the producers of those substances, not agricultural production. They are helpful to the industry whose products have realistic market prices and that uses the subsidies to cover up its business deficits.

[Radonjic] The true indication of the worthiness of an agrarian policy is the level of subsidies in relation to the value of agricultural production. In developed countries, that level runs between 30 and 50 percent, while here it is all of seven or eight percent.

[Simin] It is quite obvious from this what Serbia means by a worthwhile agrarian policy!

Such an agrarian policy can be ensured only by a true federation, not by some sort of semiconfederation, which is what Yugoslavia actually is today, and even less so by an asymmetrical federation or—God forbid—by a confederation. And that is one of the reasons that Serbia

is in favor of a federal Yugoslavia, because otherwise, in part because of the impossibility of pursuing agrarian policy, it cannot survive.

For Serbia it is untenable, even if within the framework of Yugoslavia, to be left to its own devices, to pursue its own agrarian policy, to subsidize food production and to supply the food thus subsidized to the other parts of Yugoslavia that refuse to participate in the execution of a worthy agrarian policy.

Our country must join international regional organizations and integration efforts, such as the OECD and EFTA [European Free Trade Association], which we will be joining as early as the beginning of 1992, which is the entrance way to the most important door, the door to the European Community. We must realize that the road of agrarian development should pass through Europe.

We also need to have a more aggressive developmental marketing option. We must give our food producers access to the world markets, where they must trade under the same terms as other world producers.

[Radonjic] Does Serbia have a program for agricultural development?

[Simin] It has been realized for the first time in Serbia that agriculture is the second most important branch of the Serbian economy, after industry.

For the first time, agriculture has been accorded a place "according to merit," in the Republic's plans and programs for the period from 1991 to 2000.

Extensive agricultural production, with an inadequate structure, affects the overall economic and social development of Serbia. Agricultural activity, direct and indirect, contributes to the creation of approximately one-half of the social product; one-quarter of the working population is engaged in agriculture, while half of the population of Serbia lives in rural areas or depends on agriculture.

[Radonjic] Over the past two years, the FEC [Federal Executive Council] has pursued a policy of explicitly depressing the prices of agricultural products.

[Simin] If you compare December 1988 with December 1989, it is obvious that the prices of agricultural products lag behind those of industrial products by more than six times. Such trends have continued this year as well.

Instead of the Federal Board for Commodity Reserves buying up 600,000 metric tons of wheat this year, the entire harvest had to be taken over by the Boards for Commodity Reserves of Vojvodina and Serbia.

For the government, which boasts \$10 billion in foreign currency reserves, perhaps it is not much to spend two and a half dinars per kilogram on a million metric tons of wheat—a total of \$250 million. If it is revealed that even half a dinar per kilogram was controversial, then all that was needed was \$50 million! The federal government

must guarantee for the state not only foreign currency reserves, but also sizable commodity reserves, with the help of which a stable market situation is maintained.

Instead, the federal government decided to depress production—two years already of overcharging producers and destroying the agricultural market. It has imported large quantities of flour at dumping prices. A similar, if not even worse policy has been perpetuated in the buying up of fall agricultural products.

Last year, from January to September, agricultural and foodstuff products valued at \$1.65 billion were imported, which is 2.7 times more than during the same period the preceding year!

Consequently, the effects of the federal government's economic reform measures are staggering, especially in the area of prices and the use of commodity reserves. But if we add to this the restrictive and erroneous credit-monetary policy, then the picture is complete.

The government is not agitated by the consequences of its policy in the area of agriculture, probably in part because the effects of this policy are not equally felt by all the regions of Yugoslavia.

[Radonjic] Are the funds that the federal government is investing in agriculture able to reach the farmer, or are they blocked by the monopolies of big agricultural combines?

[Simin] One of the manipulations is the contention that the monopolies of big combines are keeping the funds from getting to the farmer.

Both combines and farmers are in an equally inauspicious position, under the same dark cloud, precisely due to the federal government's measures.

Serbia has 5,728,000 hectares of land, which is 60 percent of the total agricultural potential of Yugoslavia. That is an enormous potential, even compared to economically developed countries.

Our Republic continually has surpluses of food, and the fundamental issue is improving agricultural production and marketing, and undertaking measures to stimulate this production. Of the 5,728,000 hectares, 600,000 hectares are meadows and grasslands on which it is possible, with natural means and ecologically acceptable methods, to produce healthy food, which the world needs today.

Serbia has the opportunity to make use of the comparative advantage that it has in its flat ground, in Vojvodina and Kosovo, but also in its mountainous area. By combining these two natural settings to produce food, it is possible to achieve highly productive, high-quality, and competitive production.

This is why we regard agriculture as Serbia's big opportunity for development.

[Radonjic] How do you keep young people in the rural areas?

[Simin] One of the most important developmental priorities in Serbia's program for agriculture to the year 2000 is the program for revitalizing the rural areas, which must be enabled to develop small industry and all the services and activities that a rural village needs.

The basic program for revitalizing rural areas is to create adequate conditions for young people to live in rural areas and for them to return there after they become technologically superfluous in the city or, simply put, they see that it is in their interest to return to the village. Serbia's long-term program for agriculture, in pursuit of revitalizing the rural areas, provides for an entire series of measures, such as tax incentives to enlarge landed property, investment in land, and the purchase and import of agricultural technology.

In this sense, the return of dispossessed land is also important. Many will return to the rural areas on this basis.

All of these measures should be implemented exclusively through economic means, not through administrative ones.

The resources for this purpose could be earmarked from the Republic's agrarian budget, from the corresponding funding for water, land settlement, and specialized agricultural services.

It is also indispensable to commit funds from the International Bank, to which we have already applied for several projects. There are talks under way, from which several agreements have been concluded, on joint investments of foreign capital and the formation of mixed enterprises.

In addition, the Law on Concessions has been passed, which will make it possible to use foreign capital in the area of agriculture through a concession. We feel that enterprises of the food industry as well must enter into concessionary arrangements in order to produce food earmarked for export.

[Radonjic] There is criticism to the effect that Serbia is selling itself out in this way.

[Simin] Every concessionary arrangement will be approved by the Serbian Assembly. And if someone wants to sell out, they will not be able to do so.

[Radonjic] What was achieved through the recently adopted measures by the Serbian Assembly in the area of agriculture?

[Simin] Aside from the quota that will be established, Serbia will not import food. These measures make possible a completely normal exchange. Serbia, however, should not import products of which it has a surplus. It is possible to do this only if necessary in order to stabilize prices.

[Radonjic] A law on returning land was adopted in Serbia through the Assembly process way back in 1953. Farmers are obstinate in their insistence that only "land for land" be returned to them....

[Simin] The pillar of agrarian development in Serbia is the family farm. Through the agrarian reform measures after the war, the majority of the land was dispossessed from German emigrants—67 percent, 20 percent from large landowners, and around 8 percent from others. This agrarian pool was divided among so-called external and internal colonization. A minor share was converted into the present-day state farms.

The fate of this land must be decided through the process of restructuring social ownership.

Similar action will be taken by the German state with farmland in the former GDR; the land will be issued to those who work it best, with an option to buy.

It is normal that farmers were hit very hard, whereby the 1953 law reduced the maximum to 10 hectares, thus destroying the farmer middle class, which was the rural elite. They were more seriously affected by the measures of repression and dispossession of land under the pretext of the surplus appropriation system.

In Serbia, it has been decided to return dispossessed land, because that is an indispensable measure of the rule-of-law state, through which the injustice inflicted on farmers will be redressed. The land will be returned to its previous owners or their descendants, regardless of whether or not they are involved in agriculture.

Wherever possible, "land for land" will be returned, exactly that which was dispossessed.

The law provides for a very simple procedure for claiming and proving the right to the return of land, a procedure that is short, clear, and reasonable. The goal is to restore trust and confidence in the rule-of-law state among farmers.

[Radonjic] Is the idea to hurt state farms?!

[Simin] For enterprises that for 45 years have not acquired land and capital, it is adequate to make it possible for them to make progress and to include them in contemporary agricultural developments. It would be difficult to maintain them without these measures.

For such enterprises, a transitional period of five years is foreseen in order to fulfill their obligations in terms of returning land.

The law provides for a very simple procedure for claiming and proving the right to the return of land, a procedure that is short, clear, and reasonable. The goal is to restore trust and confidence in the rule-of-law state among farmers.

[Radonjic] Will Serbia return to the cooperative system?

[Simin] The cooperative organization has a long tradition in Serbia. Cooperatives are natural, economic, and rational forms of farmer organization. Some cooperatives will be of a general character, and some will be specialized. In the future, the cooperative system will be free of all ideological premises. It will function exclusively on the basis of economic principles, the interest of the cooperative, and joint-stock foundations.

[Radonjic] Is there interest in investments of foreign capital in Serbian agriculture?

[Simin] Companies from Italy and the Netherlands are interested in investing, as are some Israeli corporations.

Germany has invested its capital in the production of natural and healthy food in the Vucje basin in Leskovac district, where, at a relatively high elevation, there is an enterprise in operation with primary production, a refrigeration plant, a heating plant, and distilling.

Besides healthy food, foreigners are also interested in investing their capital in the production of industrial crops, food production, livestock production, seeds, medicinal plants, woodland produce, and various other products.

Our citizens as well are interested in investing capital in agricultural production. In Serbia, there is already a large number of small private plants for processing agricultural products, dairies, and warehouses. An entire series of private projects is being approved through Agrobank, which is significant in the context of revitalizing the rural areas and getting the youth to return.

[Radonjic] Can Serbia guarantee selling prices for a farmer in advance?

[Simin] In our program for the development of agriculture until 2000, there is a strong set of instruments for real protective prices, but also prices for quotas. Whenever quotas are prescribed, prices too will be guaranteed. Consequently, the prices will be guaranteed for this production, which is included in the balance sheets. Serbia will establish order in this area, because all states with a developed agriculture do this.

[Radonjic] Ecologically speaking, Serbia has very favorable conditions for producing healthy food, since healthy food presupposes healthy water, air, and soil. How will control over the use of pesticides be ensured?

[Simin] This question is of great importance. In small operations, but also in mass production, processes must take place in an ecologically acceptable way. There must be a reduction in the use of chemicals, even though there are conflicting opinions among experts concerning their use. Chemical substances in agricultural production must be replaced by a system of crop rotation, which, through biological measures, makes it possible to control weeds and pests. If this does not help, then pesticides must be used rationally. The question is whether it is more profitable to have higher value healthy food at high prices or to use pesticides and have higher production at

lower prices. Serbia has decided in favor of a combination that will make it possible to have both natural processes and rational production. Sales of such products is better and are more export oriented.

We must reduce the concentration of production and move into dispersion, especially since Serbia has an enormous amount of space.

We must rigorously control the use of all pesticides through regional institutions of agricultural experts.

[Radonjic] Can the model that Serbia wants to apply to agriculture be compared to others in the developed countries of Europe?

[Simin] Serbia has good cooperative ties with the Agriculture Ministry of Bavaria, whose experiences in promoting agricultural production—cattle raising, selection work, and artificial insemination—we have had opportunities to learn and study.

We are also familiar with Austria's experiences.

These two examples are enough to illustrate the direction in which Serbia wants to move in the future.

Using others' experiences, we want to avoid new experiments in our agriculture. For this reason, we are advising politicians responsible for agriculture to go on educational excursions to the West if they do not have the necessary education and know-how in this area, in order to learn something. The Serbian Ministry for Agriculture will gladly finance all such excursions by them....

[Radonjic] What do you think about the situation in Yugoslavia, its future, and a possible confederation?

[Simin] There is no doubt about it that agrarian development cannot be realized in a confederative state, since in its very essence it is not "confederative...." Serbia is interested in Yugoslavia as a state with a unified market, included in the European Community, which will allow it to create the conditions for a complete opening up of and an equitable presence on the world market. We will invest our know-how in the further evolution of this state and the revitalization of its basic functions, which have faded away. But its citizens, and not its politicians, will decide what the basic functions of this state will be.

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